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ABSTRACT
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) tightly couple information technology with physical
processes, which rises new vulnerabilities such as physical attacks that are beyond
conventional cyber attacks. Attackers may non-invasively compromise sensors and spoof
the controller to perform unsafe actions. This issue is even emphasized with the increasing
autonomy in CPS. While this fact has motivated many defense mechanisms against sensor
attacks, a clear vision of the timing and usability (or the false alarm rate) of attack
detection still remains elusive. Existing works tend to pursue an unachievable goal of
minimizing the detection delay and false alarm rate at the same time, while there is a clear
trade-off between the two metrics. Instead, this dissertation argues that attack detection
should bias different metrics (detection delay and false alarm) when a system sits in
different states. For example, if the system is close to unsafe states, reducing the detection
delay is preferable to lowering the false alarm rate, and vice versa. This dissertation
proposes two real-time adaptive sensor attack detection frameworks. The frameworks can
dynamically adapt the detection delay and false alarm rate so as to meet a detection
deadline and improve usability according to different system statuses. We design and
implement the proposed frameworks and validate them using realistic sensor data of
automotive CPS to demonstrate its efficiency and efficacy.
Further, this dissertation proposes Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack
recovery framework that restores CPS from sensor attacks. The importance of attack
recovery is emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack’s impact on a system and restore
it to continue functioning. We propose a double sliding window-based checkpointing
protocol to remove compromised data and keep trustful data for state estimation.
Together, the proposed solutions enable a holistic attack resilient solution for
automotive cyber-physical systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview of Cyber-physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are systems that monitor or control a physical
mechanism using computer-based algorithms. These systems are enabled by a deep
integration of software and hardware components. The software components, usually
referred to as cyber components, consist of the computing and communication aspects of
the system. The hardware component or the physical components refer to sensors and
actuators. Sensors measure the state of system whereas actuators control and move the
mechanism or system such as increasing throttle, opening a valve etc. Note that sensors
and actuators can also be referred to as the interface between the physical and the cyber
world. The basis of CPS includes embedded systems, computers, and software embedded
in devices whose primary focus is not computation including but not limited to medical
devices, cars, and scientific instruments. CPSs are feedback systems with a feedback loop
where the computations affect the physical process and vice versa. Examples of CPS
include smart grid systems, medical monitoring devices, industrial control systems,
building controls, autonomous vehicles etc.
Increasingly, CPSs play important roles in government, critical infrastructure and daily
lives. While the modern society has reaped many benefits from these systems, the full
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economic and societal potential has not been realized. Hence, huge investments are being
made globally to develop the technology.
Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), such as self-driving cars and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), are becoming an integral part of our daily lives. For example,
Amazon’s Prime Air service seeks to use drones to deliver orders up to five pounds in 30
minutes or less and has already demonstrated its feasibility in [7]. UAVs have also been
seen in applications such as aerial photography [20], policing and surveillance [19] [36],
infrastructure inspections [35], construction site management [21] and many others.
Self-driving cars continue to attract huge investments from big companies and they are
expected to be in common use in the near future [39] [77].

1.2

Problem Overview

Due to the safety-critical roles that they play, autonomous CPS security continues to
be an essential requirement for its safe functioning. However, the deep intertwinement of
physical processes, software, and hardware has increased the attack surface of systems
that once had closed architectures. At the cyber level, CPS now suffer attacks similar to
what traditional computer software and network face such as buffer overflow, network
eavesdropping (sniffing), packet spoofing, data modification attacks, etc. At the physical
level, an adversary is able to compromise the physical environment of a system that leads
to the injection of malicious signals which impairs the function and behavior of the
system. This type of attack is referred to as physical attacks and examples include
dazzling cameras with light, injecting false radar signals, injecting false GPS signals, etc.
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Comparatively, defense solutions for cyber attacks are more advanced than physical
attacks because traditional cyber-security solutions are viable defense against cyber
attacks. For instance, firmware hardening [81], control-flow integrity [16], memory
isolation [48], etc, can defend CPS cyber attacks. These solutions are, however, weak
against physical attacks since these attacks do not directly target the software components.
This is especially emphasized by non-invasive sensor attacks. These attacks do not require
physical access to the target component and have been shown to be easy (requiring a
modicum of knowledge) and inexpensive (requiring cheap equipment to execute).
Rutkin [80] showed how non-invasive attacks enabled malicious signals to be injected into
GPS sensors, and in the end misguided a yacht off course. Similarly, Shoukry et al. [86]
demonstrated how non-invasive attacks on wheel speed sensors influenced Anti-lock
Braking Systems (ABS) of a vehicle to malfunction. Petit et al. [76] also showed how an
automotive CPS camera and LiDAR can be attacked remotely. In addition, the
consequences of sensor attacks will be even exaggerated as the autonomy increases.
Therefore, there is the urgent need for physical attack defense solutions.
The urgent need to protect autonomous CPS from physical sensor attacks has
motivated a lot of research efforts which can be can be categorized into (1) attack
detection and (2) attack recovery.

1.2.1

Attack Detection Limitations

Attack detection is one of the important strategies for securing CPS from malicious
attacks. The ability to detect malicious behaviors early sets the stage to provide

4
countermeasures that either prevent further attacks or mitigates the damaging effects of
the attack. Many research efforts have proposed detection solutions such as
attack-resilient sensor fusion [41, 60, 65], model-based attack detection [14, 29, 78], and
data-based detection [2, 32, 37, 43, 75, 84]. However, the timing and usability of attack
detection have not been adequately addressed in existing works. This timing constraint is
the detection deadline, before which attacks must be detected. The usability refers to the
false alarm rate, and a lower (higher) rate means a better (worse) usability. Existing works
tend to minimize the detection delay and false alarm rate at the same time. However, the
goal is deemed to be unachievable because of the clear trade-off between the two metrics,
i.e., lower delay coming with higher false alarm rate, and vice versa [29, 89, 91]. Hence,
we believe that attack detection should have a preference on different metrics when a
system runs in different states.

1.2.2

Attack Recovery Limitations

The new CPS threats have motivated many research efforts to defend against sensor
attacks. However, most of them have focused on attack detection rather than recovery
measures. Raising attack alerts, usually done in attack detection works, do not ensure the
continuous functioning of the CPS. Hence, to respond to attack alerts, recovery measures
are required to mitigate the effect of an attack on a system and continue the system’s
operation with minimum interruption.
Only a few existing works have addressed attack-recovery in any form. As the pioneer
work in this research thread, Kong et al. [51, 102] assumes full observability of the system
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and replaces measurements of compromised sensors by model-predicted values. Fei et
al. [23] follow the idea of [51] and proposes a redundant controller for attack recovery that
is trained also based on the system model. Although these works validate the performance
under their own settings, they require prior knowledge of system dynamics that builds the
system model.

1.3

Proposed Solution

1.3.1

Detection

This dissertation proposes two real-time adaptive sensor attack detection frameworks
that can dynamically adjust detection delay and false alarms. The key rationale behind this
framework is as follows.
(i) Why real-time? Given safety-critical CPS, timing is important, as untimely defense,
that is, detection of an attack after consequences occur, is just as damaging. For example,
consider the cruise control function under a speed sensor spoofing attack that changes the
true measurement to a smaller value. Then the vehicle is misled to accelerate so that the
real speed can be much higher than the desired. This attack needs to be detected before
the vehicle crashes into the front car. This timing constraint is referred to as the detection
deadline, before which attacks must be detected.
(ii) Why adaptive? On the one hand, a shorter detection delay is not always favorable.
In the end, we can have an attack detector that raises an alert at every control period. The
detector will discover an attack once it occurs, and thus the detector has the shortest
detection delay. However, this will give an unmanageable number of false alarms and thus
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unacceptably low usability. On the other hand, an alert can be raised after monitoring
multiple control periods to ascertain the occurrence of an attack. However, this can lead to
increased detection delay. Hence, we argue that there is a need to adapt the attack
detection so that it can make the appropriate trade-off. For example, if the system is
already close to unsafe states and thus the detection deadline is stringent, reducing the
detection delay will be preferable to lowering the false alarm rate, and vice versa. To
enable real-time adaptive detection, this dissertation proposes two frameworks: a
CUSUM-based framework and a variable window-based framework.
The CUSUM-based real-time adaptive attack detection framework consists of three
necessary components: attack detector, behavior predictor, and drift adaptor, as shown in
Fig. 3.1. The technical contribution for each component is as follows.
(i) Attack Detector. As the core of our framework, this component detects anomalies
using a CUSUM algorithm that monitors the cumulative sum of residuals between the
nominal (estimated by the behavior predictor) and observed sensor values. The algorithm
will raise an alarm when the cumulative sum of the residuals is greater than a predefined
threshold. Importantly, we augment this algorithm with a drift parameter that governs both
the detection delay and false alarms. That is, the algorithm can adjust the two metrics by
changing the drift parameter.
(ii) Behavior Predictor. This component estimates nominal sensor values that are fed
to the core component. It uses a deep learning (DL) model that is offline extracted through
uncovering and exploiting both the local and complex long-term dependencies in
multivariate sequential sensor measurements. Thus this model depends on little
knowledge of the physical system (e.g., dynamics). Further, this model leverages
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convolutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN) to capture
non-linear aspects in sensor data and uses autoregressive models to capture linear aspects.
This combination results in high robustness and scalability in handling the sequential
sensor data.
(iii) Drift Adaptor. The third component is a drift adaptor that estimates a detection
deadline and then determines the drift parameter. The detector component uses this
parameter for adjusting the detection delay to ensure timely detection as the detection
deadline varies over time.
The variable window-based real-time adaptive attack detection framework also
consists of three components: attack detector, state predictor, and window adaptor. The
technical contribution for each component is as follows.
(i) Attack Detector. The attack detector uses a stateful detection strategy to monitor the
residual sequence for a period of time called the time window. It raises an alert whenever
the accumulated residual sequence within the time window exceeds a predefined
threshold. An essential parameter to the detection algorithm is the window length, which
controls or adjusts the detection delay and false alarms metrics.
(ii) State Predictor. The second component of the framework, state predictor, uses a
temporal convolutional network (TCN) model to estimate the nominal sensor values
which are used in the attack detection algorithm. The TCN model captures the
relationship among correlated sensors to make predictions.
(iii) Window Adaptor. This two-phased component estimates a detection deadline and
then determines the window length parameter. This is the parameter that is passed to the
attack detector component for adjusting the detection delay to ensure timely detection.
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We implement our frameworks and validate them using realistic sensor data of
automotive CPS from the AEGIS Big Data Project [44]. The results demonstrate that our
frameworks can detect attacks in a real-time manner.

1.3.2

Recovery

To address the limitations of existing attack recovery, this dissertation proposes
Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores automotive
cyber-physical systems from sensor attacks. The framework requires little knowledge of
the system’s dynamics, but leverages natural redundancy among heterogeneous sensors
and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework consists of two major
components: state predictor and data checkpointer. At the core of this solution are novel
techniques to realize these components.
First, the state predictor is activated to estimate system states when an attack is
detected. The predicted states are forwarded to the controller to calculate and issue
appropriate control commands to bring the system back to normalcy. The predictor is built
on a deep learning model that captures the nominal system behavior. The model exploits
the natural redundancy as well as the short and long term temporal correlation among
heterogeneous sensors on an autonomous CPS, through combining convolutional neural
network (CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN).
Second, the data checkpointer executes in the normal mode when no attack is detected.
It employs a checkpointing protocol to remove corrupted data and keep valid historical
data as input to the state predictor to make state estimation. The protocol uses double
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sliding windows: detection window and logging window. The former accommodates the
substantial detection delay (i.e., the time interval between the start of an attack and the
detection of it), during which the correctness of the sensor data is still in question and thus
using them may result in unsuccessful recovery. The logging window governs sufficient
trustful data for the state prediction.
We implement and evaluate the effectiveness of our framework using a real-world data
set, AEGIS Big Data Project [44], and a ground vehicle simulator, Ardupilot SITL
Rover [1]. The results show that the proposed framework is capable of ensuring
continuous functionality in presence of sensor attacks.

1.4

Overview of dissertation

This dissertation asks three questions (1) how can we detect when an attack occurs?,
(2) how can we adapt the behavior of the detector so that it can meet a detection
deadline? and (3) how can an attacked automotive CPS continue to function during an
attack?. All these questions are aimed at securing the autonomous CPS against physical
attacks. Cyber attacks are out of scope since many traditional software security solutions
are able to defend them. The proposed solutions together with cyber attack defense
solutions can enable a holistic attack resilient solution for autonomous CPS.
The dissertation describes the design, implementation and evaluations of the proposed
frameworks mentioned in the previous section. It is presented in the following manner.
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the thesis and an overview of the material presented within
the dissertation. Chapter 2 is a survey of background material that presents a taxonomy of
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the current state of the art of CPS attack detection and attack recovery. Chapter 3 presents
the real-time adaptive sensor attack detection frameworks by explaining the novel
contributions of their design, implementation and evaluation. Chapter 4 presents the
design, implementation and evaluation details of the attack recovery framework.
Chapter 5 provides a summary of all findings, conclusions and future work.

1.5

Previous publications

This dissertation is composed of works that have been published in peer-reviewed
conferences and manuscripts that are currently under submission as a peer-reviewed
conference paper. A portion of the attack detection work is published in the proceedings
of 27th IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS
2021) [5]. The window-based attack detection portion of the dissertation is currently
under submission to the 40th edition of International Conference On Computer Aided
Design (ICCAD 2021). The content of chapter 2 has been published in the Fourth
International Conference on Connected and Autonomous Driving (MetroCAD 2021).
Chapter 4 is based a work which has been accepted for publication in the 27th IEEE
International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and
Applications (RTCSA 2021).
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2. BACKGROUND
This chapter presents a survey of existing sensor attack detection and attack recovery
proposed solutions. Understanding the techniques, the capabilities and limitations of these
prior works provides an understanding of how the state of the art in attack detection has
advanced and provides an avenue to explore future research effort.

2.1

Physical Invariant Based Attack Detection

This section studies how to detect attacks on autonomous vehicles, and specially focus
on physical invariant-based attack detection. A physical invariant (PI) is defined as a
property that a physical system always holds, i.e., the evolution of system states (usually
measured by sensors) follows immutable physical laws. We first discuss existing research
efforts of PI-based attack detection and classify them according to the knowledge of
physical invariants and sensor redundancy. While the autonomous vehicle faces both
cyber attacks and physical attacks we only focus on the latter. As mentioned in Chapter 1,
defenses against cyber attacks are relatively advanced due to the many traditional
cybersecurity techniques already available. Comparatively, proposed solutions for
defending against physical attacks are few and more challenging. We survey research
efforts that seek to detect physical attacks in autonomous vehicles. Since the physical
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properties are often measured with sensors, we focus on research works that address the
detection of false sensor attacks.

2.1.1

Classification based on physical invariant knowledge

Physical systems have properties that are guarded by immutable physical laws. When
attacks are successfully launched, they violate these laws. In order to determine such a
violation, it is essential to have a model that accurately approximates the nominal system
behavior. The observed behavior can then be compared with the expected behavior (based
on the model) to determine a violation of the physical invariant. This has been the general
idea behind many attack detection publications in recent years.
Building an accurate model to approximate the nominal system behavior requires
knowledge about the system and its dynamics. Modeling the complete system dynamics
requires in-depth knowledge and expertise which may not always be available. Hence,
recent publications have used two approaches to learn system dynamics. We group
publications into two groups namely (1) black box and (2) grey box based on how they
capture the system dynamics or physical invariants in their model. Further, we discuss
how the model is used for attack detection.

Black-box approach

Publications in this category treat the system as a black box and build a model from
the system data, such as sensor readings, control input and output, and system logs. The
insight of this approach is that, when the system operating in a normal state, the data or
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readings captured by the sensor are directly proportional to the system obeying physical
laws. Therefore, the data model that is built from the system data reflects the physical
invariant of the system. The popular tools that have been employed in publications to
learn system behavior from system data are machine and deep learning techniques. The
techniques mine for relevant information and/or relationships among nominal system data.
The black box attack detection approach often has two phases: online and offline
phases. The offline and online phases are summarized in Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.3 respectively.
The offline phase or the model training phase starts with collecting data about the system
usually consisting of sensor or actuator data. The data collected is pre-processed in order
to improve the quality of the data as well as transform it into a form that is required by the
chosen machine or deep learning model. The data pre-processing step may include one or
more of the following: handling null values, handling categorical values, standardization,
and one-hot encoding. The pre-processed data is fed into the machine or deep learning
model such as a convolutional neural network (CNN), recurrent neural network (RNN),
autoencoder, regression model, etc. The researchers in the papers we selected make
different contributions at this stage. Some combine two or more DL/ML models so their
trained models can learn certain patterns of interest. Others also reuse existing DL/ML
architectures or make simple changes to existing ones. During model training, the output
data of the DL/ML model is compared with ground truth data and a loss function
calculates a score such as the reconstruction error, prediction error or assigns a label. The
training process continues by optimizing and updating the model using the score obtained
in the previous step. The output of the offline phase is a trained model that is capable of
predicting or classifying observed system behavior.
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Table 2.1: Taxonomy based on physical invariant.
Black Box

Grey Box

He et. al [37]
Li et. al [58]
Quinonez et. al [78]
Van et. al [92]
Choi et. al [14]
Javed et. al [42]
Shin et. al [85]

Correlation
He et. al [37]
Ganesan et. al [25]
Li et. al [58]
Parker et. al [75]
Guo et. al [31]

The online phase deploys the trained model so that it can make predictions or
classifications when the system is running. The anomaly detection algorithm, in most of
the papers surveyed, compares the output of the trained model with the observed signals
and then calculates an anomaly score using time-window approaches or statistical
methods such as cumulative sum (CUSUM), chi-square, etc. The detector raises an alert
whenever the anomaly score exceeds a certain pre-determined threshold.

Grey-box approach

Attack detection solutions in this category have some knowledge about the system and
even know the physical invariant. Instead of learning the structure of the model, such
papers make their contributions by learning the parameters of the invariants utilizing
techniques such as system identification (SI). Such solution is provided in [78] and [14].
Generally, these solutions also have two phases: offline and online phases as shown in
Fig. 2.2. The offline phase extracts the physical invariants that are used to build a model
that captures the underlying or expected relationships between the sensors and actuators.
In other words, the model captures the expected inputs and outputs of the system. The
techniques used at this phase may also capture the expected relationship among sensors.
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Fig. 2.1.: The offline phase

The solutions in this category have explored both linear [14] and non-linear
approaches [78] to describe the physical invariants of AVs. The linear approach assumes a
Linear Dynamical State-space (LDS) system which is widely used in system dynamics
and control. LDS is given as:

xk+1 = Axk + Buk
(2.1)
yk = Cxk
where xk ∈ Rn denotes the autonomous vehicle’s physical-state vectors; uk ∈ Rm is
the control input vectors; yk ∈ Rp denotes the AV’s output vectors from measurements of
sensors. A, B, and C are the system matrices that are unique for each physical process.
Hence, each AV has unique values for A, B and C. The proposed solutions in this
category use various techniques to learn these system matrices’ parameters, popular
among them is system identification.
System identification (SI) is a control system engineering methodology that is used to
learn the parameters for the system matrices. The two inputs to the SI method are (1) a
control invariant template i.e. equation of a certain degree/form with unknown
coefficients/parameters and (2) a vehicle profiling measurement data set including the
system inputs, outputs, and states. The vehicle profiling measurement data set is obtained
by letting the subject autonomous vehicle perform a set of missions or rides. The runtime
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inputs (target states) and system states are measured and recorded during the execution of
the missions. When the needed inputs are provided, the SI method then performs
computations that instantiate the unknown system matrices (A, B, and C). The resultant
equation, therefore, becomes the model for the system which is used in the online phase to
predict the behaviors of the autonomous vehicle based on inputs and states. Essentially,
the resultant equation serves as the control invariants of the vehicle [14].
Although the linear invariant approach works for a wide number of dynamical
systems, autonomous vehicles tend to follow a non-linear invariant as noted
in [15, 28, 61, 78]. This approach requires more complex equations than LDS. Authors
in [78] indicate that the physical invariants of the quad-copter used in their experiment can
be described with 12 non-linear differential equations “that exploit Newton and Euler
equations for the 3D motion of a rigid body”. The equations oversee the position, speed,
angles, and angular speed of the quad-copter. Note here that each type of autonomous
vehicle will have its own set of non-linear differential equations that describe its physical
invariants. The parameters of these equations are learned using the SI method discussed
above for linear systems. Besides the non-linear equations’ input, the parameters are

Model / Control
Invariant

Offline phase
Control template
(uninstantiated eqn)
System Identification
(SI)

Anomaly Detection
Algorithm

Online
phase

Normal
Anomaly

AV profile information
Observed signals

Fig. 2.2.: The general workflow for the grey-box approach. It consists of (1) offline phase
where parameters of the control template are learned and (2) online phase where the
anomaly detection algorithm uses model predictions and observed signals to determine
presence or absence of anomaly
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Fig. 2.3.: The online phase

learned in the same way. Particularly, the learning of non-linear parameters is formulated
as an optimization problem which is given as [78]:

min
P

T
X

(Ht (P, Ut ) − Yt )2

(2.2)

t=1

where U and Y are the input and output data respectively; P refer to the set of unknown
parameters {p1 , p2 ...}. Ht (P, Ut ) denote the estimated output at each sampling instant t
for the given parameters P and the input Ut . Note that Ht (P, Ut ) is the solution the
differential equations F (·). The goal of Eqn. 2.2 is to find the parameters P that better fit
the data. In other words, Eqn. 2.2 seeks to find the set of parameters P that minimize the
least square error between the estimated output Ht (P, Ut ) and the measured output Y .
Once the unknown parameters are computed, the resultant equations, therefore, become
the model for the system which is used in the online phase to predict the behaviors of the
autonomous vehicle based on inputs and states.
The online phase consists of an anomaly detection mechanism or algorithm that
simply compares the predictions of the model that was built during the offline phase with
observed signals or states. The difference between the predictions and the observed states,
also called the residual error, are accumulated in two ways. The first approach
accumulates the residual error as long as no attack has been detected as was done in [78].
The accumulation is reset whenever an attack is detected. The second approach
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accumulates the residual error for a set period of time (window) and then resets whenever
the time window expires [14]. Either way, an alarm is raised whenever the accumulated
residual error exceeds a predetermined threshold.
While the solutions in this category are robust in their attack detection role, they
remain weak against stealthy attacks mainly due to perturbations and uncertainties in the
model. Stealthy attacks create small deviations over time by spoofing or creating
malicious data that allow the system to behave seemingly normally. Stealthy attacks are
hard to defend against and remain an open problem in autonomous vehicle attack
detection. Researchers in [78] are the first to propose a solution to stealthy attacks in
autonomous vehicles.

2.1.2

Classification based on correlation

Immutable physical laws cause multiple sensors to exhibit correlations that can be
exploited for attack detection. The multiple sensors could be measuring the same system
state or not. Multiple sensors measuring the same physical state are called homogeneous
sensors whereas those measuring different physical system states are referred to as
heterogeneous sensors. We classify publications that exploit correlation that naturally
exists among sensors for attack detection purposes into two groups: (1) homogeneous
sensors and (2) heterogeneous sensors attack detection.
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Homogeneous sensors attack detection

Multiple sensors measuring the same physical phenomenon are expected to have their
measurements correlating. When this natural redundancy is not observed, it could be an
indication of a possible attack, and this has been the basis for publications in this category.
For instance, when four wheel speed sensors are used to monitor the speed of a vehicle’s
wheel, they should all report similar readings under normal operation.
Researchers in [49] propose a switching algorithm that searches for a combination of
sensors that have not been compromised and generates estimates that are insensitive to
sparse malicious attacks. The algorithm assumes that some of the redundant sensors have
been compromised.
Although this is a good approach to attack detection, it has some limitations. First, it
increases the cost of production as multiple sensors of the same type have to be deployed.
This leads to increased power consumption. Also, more space will be required to
accommodate the multiple sensors leading to increased weight. In applications where a
lighter weight is desired, this approach may be impractical. On the other hand, fooling the
attack detection may be easier since the same attack strategy and equipment can be used to
attack the multiple sensors simultaneously. For example, the attacker may successfully
cause all speed sensors to report 5mph thereby preserving the correlation.

Heterogeneous sensors attack detection

The attack detection solutions in this category hinge on the observation that some set
of sensors within an autonomous vehicle are correlated in terms of their
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readings [25, 31, 37, 58]. Remember that this observation is guided by physical laws. For
instance, as a car moves faster, naturally, the wheels spin faster, the engine speed
increases, and the pressure applied to the pedals also increases. Therefore, this natural
phenomenon causes effects on sensors that monitor the wheel speed, engine speed, and
pedal. Given that this natural redundancy holds all the time due to physical laws, a
violation of the observation to some degree could be an indication of an attack. Hence, the
proposed solutions in this category capture this physical invariant by using various
methods that exploit the correlation or the natural redundancy that exists among the
different sensors. Generally, the detector raises an alert whenever the natural redundancy
no longer holds due to attacks.
The methods used to exploit the correlation are varied including cluster analysis [25],
Pearson correlation analysis [82], autoencoders [37], regression [58]. In cluster analysis,
researchers first build tools to determine the context and the cluster that the identified
context belongs to. This is done for each time window. Then, a pairwise cross-correlation
is performed and the results are compared with the expected correlation values for that
cluster. The calculated deviation from the cluster’s mean correlation value is reported as
standard deviation from the mean.
In the regression method, the authors formulate the problem as a machine learning
regression problem. The regression model uses statistical processes to estimate the
relationships among correlated sensors. The model predicts sensor values which are then
compared with the observed sensor values. A deviation is calculated and if it exceeds a
threshold, an alert is raised.

21
EVAD [31] utilizes the frequency domain to detect attacked sensors after Fourier
transform. They also organize the correlations of sensors into a ring architecture in order
to reduce the computation overhead. EVAD exploits both the time domain and the
frequency domain property of sensor data as the criterion to detect anomalies.
Researchers in [75] also considered a system where multiple sensors measure the
same physical variable. The solution assumes that some of the redundant sensors are
attacked. The work develops a resilient sensor fusion algorithm for attack detection.
Unlike the homogeneous approach discussed above, this approach does not increase
the cost of production since no extra sensors are needed. Therefore, the power
consumption, space, and weight remain the same for these solutions. Also, this approach
tends to be more robust to attack since, to fool the detection and maintain the correlation,
the attacker has to launch attacks against multiple types of sensors. Based on the fact that
each type of sensor relies on different physical principles to operate, the attacker needs
multiple strategies, equipment, and varying proximity to the sensor in order to launch a
successful attack simultaneously.

2.1.3

Classification based on techniques employed

Existing works on cyber-physical systems attack detection can be categorized based
on techniques that are used.
Redundancy-based: Works that use this approach [24, 75, 100, 101] detect attacks by
using multiple system components. The duplicated system component may be software
(e.g controller) or hardware (e.g. sensors). The states or outputs of each of the duplicated

22
system components are cross-checked at runtime. In spite of its effectiveness, this
approach leads to increased cost, weight, power, space requirement and system
complexity.
Signature-based: The works that use this approach [26, 47] monitor runtime patterns
and compare them with a pre-maintained dictionary that contains known attack types or
attack patterns. For it to be effective, the dictionary needs to have the latest attack patterns.
These methods are known to be fast and have low false positives rates, however, they are
not effective in handling zero-day attacks [14, 43]
Behavioral rule-based: Behavioral rule-based techniques [9, 67, 68] models the
normal system operations by using a specification. The program state transitions or
execution time constraints are usually modeled in this approach.
Physics-based: This approach detects attacks by monitoring the physics of
cyber-physical system. It is an area of research that is attracting a lot of attention. [29]
surveys works that use this approach for cyber-physical systems in general, whereas [4]
surveys works that use this approach specifically for autonomous vehicles. Recently, [14]
and [78] applied this technique to detect physical sensor attacks. During the first of its two
steps, Physics-Based Attack Detection (PBAD) approaches extract the physical invariant
of the system and use it to model the system. Although we do not extract the physical
invariant directly, we indirectly use deep learning to learn about them. Like other
approaches, in the second step, PBAD compares the model predictions with the observed
values and raise alarm when observed states exceed a threshold.
Machine/Deep Learning: Machine Learning (ML) and Deep learning (DL)
techniques have been employed in many CPS attack detection works
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lately [2, 6, 30, 37, 40, 43, 52, 58, 63, 70, 74, 83]. These solutions build a data model by
using the system data to train a machine or deep learning model. The models are often
used to make predictions of CPS measurements such as sensors. ML and DL methods
require a large amount of data to build accurate models. While supervised ML methods
require both labeled normal and attack training data, unsupervised methods often process
only normal training data. Our solution uses an unsupervised deep learning approach. Our
work is distinguished by the incorporation of attack detection deadline estimation and
adaptive attack detection mechanism.

2.2

Attack Recovery Solutions

Attack recovery measures are meant to improve the attack-resilience of the
autonomous CPS. That is, measures that enable the CPS to function continuously in spite
of the attack. Compared with attack detection solutions, we can say that attack recovery
solutions are proactive attack resilience measure.
One of the effective ways of improving attack-resilience is to develop methods that
can estimate system states accurate enough for control regardless of the compromised
components. This way has the merit of allowing the system to use the same controller as
in the case without attacks. [73] and [22] are existing works that follow this approach.
Note that these proposed solutions are confined to sensor redundancy setting, i.e., multiple
sensors are employed to measure the same physical variables. This limitation also follows
that the proposed solutions are only applicable when the number of compromised sensors
is within a certain threshold. Hence, dealing with attack resilience in the cases that violate
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above limitations is a question that still remains. Kong [51] addresses these limitations by
proposing a solution that leverages checkpointing and recovery. That is, instead of using
redundant sensors, they use the historical data to recover the system states.
Various techniques have also been employed for state estimation. A popular technique
is sensor fusion algorithm. As noted in [41], the meaning or interpretation of the term
“sensor fusion” vary across different fields of research. While some consider the term to
mean the collection and combination of data from homogeneous redundant sensors, others
equate the meaning to the ”state estimation” of different sensors that measure different
aspects of the system’s state. The works that use sensor fusion can be categorized based
on the sensor model that is used. The first approach leverages a probabilistic model to
compute the expected results. Kalman filter [45] falls in this category where assumptions
about sensor precisions are combined with the known system dynamics model to achieve
a linear estimation of the true state. Many variations of the Kalman model have span
including [18] and [97]. These approached have the goal of achieving average
performance of a system and therefore [41] assert that they might not be suitable for
low-probability analysis of rare events. The second category of sensor fusion works
leverages an abstract sensor model instead for worst-case analysis. A pioneer work of this
approach is [65] where an assumption is made that sensors provide one-dimensional
intervals. Variations of this model includes [66], [13], [103] and [11]. The third category
of sensor fusion works treat sensor measurements a decision. All the sensor decisions are
combined in some form of a voting scheme [12, 46].
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2.3

Challenges

In this section, we discuss some of the challenges that researchers proposing attack
detection methods face. We do not discuss the challenges in any particular order of
importance.

2.3.1

Training data for data models

From our discussion above, we see that machine and deep learning techniques are
valuable for building attack detection solutions. These tools, however, require enormous
training data. The first challenge is that the publicly-available datasets are sparse and they
contain no or very few attack datapoints. One of the reasons for this is that, especially for
real-life datasets, attacks rarely occurred in the past because vehicles were then closed
system [37]. Even with modern-day vehicles that are becoming open systems, successful
attacks do not happen often. Hence, with such limited attack scenarios in the dataset, the
machine and deep learning models are constrained in learning the attack patterns as
expected to build robust models that are able to recognize attacks. In other words, CPS
attack monitoring models that are trained with insufficient data tend to respond
unfavorably to events or scenarios that they have not been seen before [95]. This data
sparsity problem was one of the causes of the 2016 Tesla crash [3].
It is worth mentioning that some proposed methods [37] have responded to this data
sparsity challenge by leveraging unsupervised machine/deep learning techniques. The
models are trained to learn the nominal behavior of the plant under study from only
normal data. Then using the principle of inclusion-exclusion, an alarm is raised whenever

26
the sensor under scrutiny does not produce data that are indications of normal activity.
However, the false positive and false negative rates are not promising for practical
applications.
Further, the normal data available are not sufficient since they usually do not contain
all the normal behavior scenarios. For instance, during the data collection stage, if the
autonomous vehicle does not perform certain activities, maneuvers, or tasks, the data
associated with these normal behaviors will not be captured in the dataset. Hence,
unsupervised learning techniques/models which only learn from normal data are misled to
classify even normal autonomous vehicle activities as abnormal.
Lastly, the sensor data obtained from autonomous vehicles can be corrupted, noisy,
faulty, missing, and may contain redundant data [95, 98]. Sensors tend to be sensitive to
interference in their environment which can lead to data corruption. In most situations or
applications, such interference is inevitable and in others, some measures can be taken to
reduce the noise. Data may also be corrupted due to the interactions occurring among
system components. Lossy communication channels especially those between the sensor
and data collection point contribute to data corruption. Identifying that a dataset is
corrupted may require some system expertise and can be challenging. The consequences
of building an attack monitor on corrupt data are quite obvious.

2.3.2

Testbeds

The availability or access to rich/practical autonomous vehicle testbed is another
challenge that researchers face. In most of the papers reviewed, evaluations are not
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performed on systems that mimic the resources that are available on real autonomous
vehicles thereby reducing the practicality of the proposed solutions. Rather, experiments
are carried out using simulated data that were run on computing resources that differ a lot
from resources available on autonomous vehicles. For instance, the operating systems that
the experiments are simulated are not a real-time OS. Also, the CPU/GPU capabilities and
memory capacity available on experimental systems are higher compared with what is
available on autonomous vehicles.
In part, high-end autonomous vehicle testbeds are expensive to acquire, limiting
research groups, especially those in developing countries, from testing out their novel
ideas and designs. Although cheaper testbeds are available, usually, they do not possess
all the sensors that may be required for the particular research. It is also possible to
custom-build autonomous vehicle testbeds, however, assembling all the components
requires expertise that may not be available in the research group or the university at large.
Even in instances where the expertise is available, the process of building the testbed can
be time-consuming. From our own experience, it has taken more than a year to build an
autonomous vehicle testbed. Further, the sharing of testbeds amongst research groups
especially those whose physical geography is farther apart may be hampered by travel
restrictions by governments, a pandemic, or other factors.

2.3.3

Benchmark for comparing related work

It is difficult to fairly and accurately compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the
various proposed attack detection methods due to the absence of “standardized”
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benchmark data. Given that each research effort evaluates their work on the data that the
researchers generate or simulate, it is difficult to tell if the proposed solutions are
applicable to only their data or work with other new data. A common benchmark can
facilitate result comparison as well inspire research proposals that perform better than
existing solutions.
Also, many researchers who have access to good testbeds or even simulate good
autonomous vehicle data often do not make their data and source code publicly available.
Such availability to the public not only aids the repeatability of the research method but
also allows others to use the data and compare the results.

2.3.4

Standard evaluation metrics

Another challenge regarding research result comparison is the lack of standard
evaluation metrics. Usually, different metrics are used for evaluating the proposed attack
detection method. This makes it difficult to know which proposal is better and even how
an existing solution should be improved based on a metric. A standard evaluation metric
can guide the current as well as the future development of evaluative metrics for attack
detection methods in autonomous vehicles. A common metric can also help the peer
review process so that reviewers can make a better judgment of papers under review
and/or make suggestions that improve research efforts.
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3. REAL-TIME ADAPTIVE SENSOR DETECTION
As noted in Chapter 1, cyber-physical systems face many new threats as a result of the
deep integration of information technology with physical process. While this fact has
motivated many defense mechanisms against sensor attacks, a clear vision on the timing
and usability (or the false alarm rate) of attack detection still remains elusive. Existing
works tend to pursue an unachievable goal of minimizing the detection delay and false
alarm rate at the same time, while there is a clear trade-off between the two metrics.
Instead, we argue that attack detection should bias different metrics when a system sits in
different states. For example, if the system is close to unsafe states, reducing the detection
delay is preferable to lowering the false alarm rate, and vice versa. To achieve this, we
make the following contributions.

3.1

Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) based attack detection

3.1.1

Contributions

This dissertation proposes a real-time adaptive sensor attack detection framework. The
framework can dynamically adapt the detection delay and false alarm rate so as to meet a
detection deadline and improve the usability according to different system status.
The core component of this framework is an attack detector that identifies anomalies
based on a CUSUM algorithm through monitoring the cumulative sum of difference (or
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residuals) between the nominal (predicted) and observed sensor values. We augment this
algorithm with a drift parameter that can govern the detection delay and false alarm. The
second component is a behavior predictor that estimates nominal sensor values fed to the
core component for calculating the residuals. The predictor uses a deep learning model
that is offline extracted from sensor data through leveraging convolutional neural network
(CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN). The model relies on little knowledge of the
system (e.g., dynamics), but uncovers and exploits both the local and complex long-term
dependencies in multivariate sequential sensor measurements. The third component is a
drift adaptor that estimates a detection deadline and then determines the drift parameter
fed to the detector component for adjusting the detection delay and false alarms. Finally,
we implement the proposed framework and validate it using realistic sensor data of
automotive CPS to demonstrate its efficiency and efficacy.

System and Threat Model

The CPS model we consider in this work is a physical system, also called a plant,
controlled by a controller. The controller operates at every δ unit of time, where δ > 0 is
called a control period. At the beginning of every control period, the controller first reads
the output of the plant or sensor measurements. Then using a control algorithm, the
controller computes the control signals or inputs that are sent to the actuators. The
actuators will apply the control inputs to the plant in the current step.
We consider attack scenarios, where the attacker is able to compromise the integrity
and availability of sensor data of autonomous CPS, as shown in Fig. 3.1.
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(i) Integrity of Sensor Measurements. The adversary is able to modify the sensor
measurements by launching spoofing attacks in the CPS’s physical environment such as
introducing noise or interference in the signals that the sensor is perceiving. The attacker
may also undertake replay attacks to compromise data integrity. A successful replay
attack enables an attacker to send previously captured data to the CPS. While the replayed
data was valid data at a particular point in the past, it does not reflect the current state of
the CPS.
(ii) Availability of Sensor Measurements. The adversary is able to delay the controller
from receiving the sensor values. The received values are out-of-date and reflect a
historical state of the system. Denial of service (DOS) attacks belong to this kind of
attack, where the delay is infinite. Signal jamming is one typical DOS attack that the
attacker can execute in the CPS’s physical environment.
This work is focused only on sensor the attacks mentioned above. We thus assume that
the adversary does not compromise the controller, the actuator, or other cyber components
of the system (cyber attacks). We do not restrict the maximum number of sensors that can
be compromised by an attacker but assume that the attacker has no knowledge of our
attack detector.

Overview of System Design

Fig. 3.1 shows the overview of the proposed adaptive real-time attack detection
framework. It has two phases: an offline training phase and an online detection phase.
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Fig. 3.1.: Design overview of the real-time adaptive sensor attack detection framework.

The offline phase consists of components that function together to learn the nominal
behavior of the system through training a deep learning model. It leverages both the local
and complex long-term dependencies that exist among sensor data. To achieve this, the
pre-processing component first screens out sensors that are correlated with each other by
calculating their pairwise correlations. Then, the Long- and Short-Term Time-Series
Network (LSTNet) component captures a consistent pattern among the correlated sensors,
which is referred to as the nominal behavior.
The online phase handles the real-time attack detection and is made up of three
components. The Behavior Predictor uses the learned model to predict nominal sensor
values. In the presence of attacks, sensor measurements (observed) will be different from
the predicted values. This difference, called the residual, is tracked by the Attack Detector
to identify anomalies. It will raise an alarm when the cumulative sum of residuals
becomes larger than a pre-defined threshold. The Drift Adaptor ensures a usable detection
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result before the detection deadline. The deadline may vary over time as the physical
environment changes. This component can dynamically adjust the detection delay to meet
the deadline via the drift parameter. To be clear, we state the workflow of the online phase
as follows. At each control period, the Behavior Predictor and Drift Adaptor first produce
nominal sensor values and the drift value, respectively. Then the Attack Detector uses
these values to identify anomalies.

3.1.2

Design of Attack Detector

In this section, we present the detailed design of the core component, Attack Detector,
in our framework. This component needs predicted sensor values and the drift parameter
from Behavior Predictor and Drift Adaptor respectively. The latter two components will
be detailed in the subsequent sections.

Problem Formulation

We formulate the attack detection problem as follows. Given the predicted nominal
sensor value ŷt ∈ Rn , observed sensor value yt ∈ Rn and the drift parameter λ, the
problem is to determine the appropriate time to raise an attack alert talarm when the
observed sensor values deviate from the expected values such that it exceeds a threshold τ :

talarm = C(yt , ŷt , λ) > τ,
where C is a change detection mechanism.

(3.1)
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Attack Detection

There are two main strategies that can be used to realize Eq. (3.1), that is, to determine
the appropriate time to raise alarm: stateless and stateful. (i) In a stateless strategy, it is
confined to monitor every single period’s residual, and an alarm is raised for every single
deviation, that is, if the residual exceeds a pre-determined threshold τ i.e, rt > τ . This
kind of strategy has been shown to have increased false positives [29]. (ii) A stateful
strategy, on the other hand, calculates the statistic St that keeps track of the historical
changes of rt . It raises alarm when there is a persistent deviation over time, i.e. St > τ .
This kind of strategy has been demonstrated to have decreased false positives [29].
We thus choose to develop a stateful strategy in our framework due to its lower false
positive rates. There are usually two kinds of stateful strategies: time window and
cumulative sum (CUSUM). (i) In a time-window-based method, the detector looks at the
residuals within a time window of multiple control periods. (ii) A CUSUM-based method,
on the other hand, efficiently tracks the cumulative sum of residuals of the whole history.
The authors in [78] demonstrate that a CUSUM-based approach tends to be faster and
more accurate than a time-window-based approach. Further, the former is more robust to
attacks that are hard to be detected by other approaches such as attacks hidden in-between
time windows and other stealthy attacks.
Hence, we present a CUSUM-based attack detection approach. The algorithm is
augmented with a drift parameter, by tuning which the detection delay and false alarms
can be changed. The algorithm outline is shown in Algorithm 1. We briefly explain the
algorithm as follows.
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Algorithm 1: The CUSUM Algorithm.
Input: threshold τ , drift λ, observed sensor value yt , predicted sensor value ŷt
Output: alarm time talarm
1 Initialize: S0 = 0;
2 while t > 0 do
3
rt = yt − ŷt ;
// the residual of control period t.
+
4
St = [St−1 + |rt | − λ] ;
// the cumulative sum;
5
// [a]+ = max{a, 0}.
6
if St > τ then
7
talarm = t;
8
St = 0;
9
end
10
// the cumulative sum is greater than the threshold;
at period t an alarm is raised; reset the sum.
11
t=t+1
12 end

Line 1 initializes the cumulative sum to zero. Line 2 calculates the residual between
the observed sensor value yt and the predicted sensor value ŷt obtained from the Behavior
Predictor. That is, this difference indicates how deviated the observed value is from the
nominal estimate. Line 3 calculates the cumulative sum St at control period t, which is a
non-negative value. Basically, it equals the cumulative sum at period t − 1 plus the
absolute value of the residual at t minus the drift parameter. The drift parameter is decided
by the Drift Adaptor. As mentioned, selecting the appropriate drift parameter is an
important aspect of the algorithm. It can impact both the detection delay and the number
of false positives. Line 4-7 checks if the cumulative sum is larger than the pre-defined
threshold. If yes, an alert talarm is raised, and St is reset to zero.
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3.1.3

Design of Behavior Predictor

In this section, we present the detailed design of behavior predictor. This component
builds a data model of the system that captures physical invariants for the purpose of
predicting sensor measurements.
Physical invariants are properties of the physical system that should always hold. The
invariants are guarded by physical laws. One method to capture physical invariants is to
use a physical system model. One disadvantage of this method is the requirement of
adequate knowledge of accurate system dynamics, which may not be easy to attain.
In this work, we approximate physical invariants using a deep learning technique
instead. The approximated physical invariant will be used as the nominal behavior of the
system. This technique treats the system as a black box and explores the correlation of
multivariate sensor data. Our insight is that if the system operates normally and obeys
physical laws, then the sensor data obtained from the CPS also indirectly obeys physical
laws. Hence, with little knowledge of the system dynamics, our deep learning approach
enables us to learn the behavior of the system in order to make accurate predictions.

Behavior
Predictor

CUSUM

Fig. 3.2.: Dataflow in attack detector.

Alert
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Problem Formulation

In order to perform the non-trivial task of predicting nominal system behavior, we
formulate the problem as a multivariate time series forecasting problem.
Given a fully observable system with n correlated sensors Y = {y1 , y2 , ..., yT } where
yt ∈ Rn , we want to extract the natural redundancy that exists among the correlated
sensors using a deep learning model D, so that we can learn the nominal behavior of the
system such that we can predict future sensor values ŷT +1 . It is assumed that
{y1 , y2 , ..., yT } will always be available whenever we predict ŷT +1 . The input to the
behavior predictor at time step T is formulated as XT = {y1 , y2 , ..., yT } ∈ Rn×T

ŷT +1 = D(XT )

(3.2)

Pre-processing

Sensors on automotive CPS exhibit physical sensor correlation or natural
redundancy [37]. We need to ensure the DL model is trained using only sensor data that
are correlated. This component uses a statistical method to observe the natural redundancy
in the dataset and also finds sensor data that are correlated but may not be obvious from
domain knowledge.
The pre-processing component builds a correlation matrix based on Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient (PCC) algorithm. Data variables or features are said to have a
positive correlation when both variables move in tandem. That is, if one variable
increases, the other variable also increases. A positive correlation also holds when one
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Fig. 3.3.: Example confirming the wheel speed sensors in the dataset has strong
correlation with the wheel speed, engine speed and boost pressure sensors.Table 3.1 shows
the available sensors in the dataset.

variable decreases and the other variable decreases as well. Conversely, two variables
have a negative correlation when one increases and the other variable decreases, and vice
versa. PCC indicates a strong positive correlation with coefficient values that are close to
+1.0 whereas a strong negative correlation has coefficients that are close to -1.0.
Coefficient values close to 0 signifies that the two variables do not have any correlation.
We select dataset features whose PCC values are either greater than 0.5 or less than -0.5 as
input to model training. For example, to observe the sensors that have natural redundancy
with the wheel speed sensor in the AEGIS CAN dataset (we describe this dataset in
section 3.1.5), we created the heatmap shown in Fig. 3.3 based on the PCC values. In the
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Dependencies

FC Layer
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Automotive
CPS Data

Autoregressive Model

Fig. 3.4.: Architecture of LSTNet model that learns both local and complex long-term
dependencies in automotive CPS sensor values for attack detection.

figure, we observe the wheel speed sensors have a strong positive correlation with vehicle
speed, engine speed, boost pressure, engine torque and oil temperature sensors.

Long- and Short-Term Time-Series Network (LSTNet)

Fig. 3.4 is an overview of the deep learning architecture used which is based on [54].
The interested reader is referred to [54] for details, here, we briefly describe each
component. Mainly, the architecture consists of a convolutional neural network (CNN), a
recurrent neural networks (RNN) as well as an autoregressive linear model.
CNN Component. The first layer of the deep learning framework is a CNN without
pooling. It is tasked to extract the temporal patterns and the local relationship between the
correlated sensor variables. This CNN layer is made up of a number of filters of width w
and height n (the number of correlated sensor variables) with each k-th filter passing
through the input matrix X to output a vector hk :

hk = RELU (Wk ∗ X + bk )

(3.3)
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where ∗ is the convolution operation, Wk and bk denote the weight parameter and bias
respectively. RELU activation function ensures values stay between 0 and 1. Each vector
hk is zero-padded on the left of the input matrix X to have a length of T . In the end, the
convolutional layer outputs a matrix of size dc × T , where dc is the number of filters. This
output matrix is inputted into the recurrent component.
Recurrent Component. The recurrent component has two sub-components namely, gated
recurrent unit (GRU) and recurrent-skip.
GRU is a specialized recurrent neural network (RNN) that is suited for modeling
sequential data such as sensor readings [53]. Unlike artificial neural networks (ANN),
GRU is able to store past information in addition to current inputs in order to determine
current outputs. The ability to store past information in GRU is enabled by the state
variables that it introduces i.e. the update and reset gates. At a time t, given the input
minibatch xt ∈ Rm×l (where m is the number of examples in the minibatch and l is the
number of inputs) and the previous hidden state ht−1 ∈ Rm×s (where s is the number of
hidden states), the reset gate zt ∈ Rm×s and update gate ut ∈ Rm×s , candidate hidden
state ct and final state ht are computed as,

zt = σ(xt Wxr + ht−1 Whr + br )
ut = σ(xt Wxu + ht−1 Whu + bu )
(3.4)
ct

= RELU (xt Wxc + rt

ht = (1 − ut )

ct + ut

(ht−1 Whc ) + bc )
ht−1
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where

is the element-wise (Hadamard) product, σ is the sigmoid function, Wxr , Wxu ,

Wxc , Whr , Whu , Whc are the weight parameters, and br , bu , bc are bias parameters.
The output of the GRU layer is the hidden state ht at each time step. Note that the use
of GRU in the recurrent component allows the deep learning model to discard irrelevant
previous sensor information and extract only the important ones that help to learn the
nominal system behavior.
The second sub-component of the recurrent component is the recurrent skip
component. This feature enables the architecture to memorize the repeated historic
periodic pattern (such as daily, weekly patterns) in time series data. However, since the
automotive CPS sensor data do not exhibit this periodic pattern, we do not turn it on in our
experiment.
The output of the recurrent component is passed to a fully connected (FC) layer as
shown in Fig. 3.4. FC combines its input to make a prediction result hD
t is at time step t.
Autoregressive Component. This component addresses a deficiency found in the
non-linear neural network components: convolutional and recurrent components. The
scale of output in neural networks is known to be insensitive to the scale of its inputs [54].
Hence, given the non-periodic nature of sensor data, this deficiency diminishes the
forecasting accuracy of the neural networks. This is solved by decomposing the final
prediction into a linear component by using an autoregressive (AR) model which is
formulated as,
q ar −1

hLt

=

X
k=0

Wkar vt−k + bar

(3.5)
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where hLt ∈ Rn is the forecasting result of the AR component, W ar ∈ Rq

ar

and

bar ∈ R are the coefficients of the AR model such that q ar is the size of input window over
the input matrix. vt−k is the past series values (lagged values).
At time step t, the DL model makes a prediction ŷt by integrating the outputs of the
neural network part and the AR component:

L
ŷt = hD
t + ht

(3.6)

Objective function. We use absolute loss (L1-loss) as the objective function which is
formulated as:
min
Θ

n−1
X X

|yt,i − ŷt,i |

(3.7)

t∈ΩT rain i=0

where Θ denotes the parameter set of our model, ΩT rain is the set of time stamps used for
training.
Although squared error function is an option often used, experiment results in [54]
indicate the absolute loss function is more robust.

3.1.4

Design of Drift Adaptor

In this section, we present the design of the drift adaptor. This component ensures
attack detection occurs before a detection deadline.
The requisite detection deadline for an autonomous CPS varies with its physical
environment. In other words, the deadline by which the attack has to be detected depends
on the physical environment. The deadline can change as the physical environment varies.
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For instance, the deadline for detecting a wheel speed attack of a vehicle that is 50m away
from an object it can crash into will be different from the situation where the crashing
object is 200m away. Hence, there is a need for real-time attack detection that adapts its
mechanism based on the physical environment or how the system is close to unsafe states,
such that the detection delay will be less than the required detection deadline.
Another motivation is the trade-off between detection delay and false alarms in our
experiment. The attack detector discussed above (in Section 3.1.2) is augmented with a
drift parameter λ that can be adjusted to produce varying detection delays and false
positives. Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 show how the drift parameter affects the detection delay
and number of false positives. We note that as the drift parameter increases, the time to
detection or detection delay increases while the number of false positives decreases.
Hence, adjusting the drift parameter enables our attack detection mechanism to adapt its
behavior for an appropriate trade-off while meeting the real-time constraint.
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Fig. 3.5.: The relationship between drift parameter and detection delay for various attack
scenarios.

44
Attack 1
Attack 2
Attack 3
Attack 4

Number of False Positives

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

Drift Parameter

0.8

1.0

Fig. 3.6.: Relationship between drift parameter and number of false positives.

The Drift Adaptor component is made up of two sub-components: Deadline Estimator
and Drift Analyzer. The deadline estimator determines the detection deadline whereas the
drift analyzer determines the appropriate drift parameter.

Deadline Estimator

The detection deadline considered in this work is the time in the future when the
system may touch the unsafe set. We consider a time that is estimated in a conservative
way, i.e., at a worst case. The authors of [102] propose a reachability-based deadline
estimation method, but it requires knowing the system dynamics. By contrast, we propose
a pure data-driven method towards this end.
The core idea of the proposed method is to first calculate the maximum change rate of
the sensor value and then use it to estimate the shortest time when the system may touch
the unsafe set. The proposed method has two phases: offline and online.
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(i) At the offline phase, we consider the collected time series of each individual sensor
i, denoted as {y1 (i), y2 (i), ...yT (i)}. The change rate of the sensor value of two adjacent
periods is defined as
∆t (i) =

yt (i) − yt−1 (i)
.
δ

(3.8)

Then using the collected time series, we use the following equations to calculate the
maximum (∆+ ) and minimum (∆− ) change rate.

∆+ (i) = [max{∆t (i), 2 ≤ t ≤ T }]+ ,
(3.9)
∆− (i) = [min{∆t (i), 2 ≤ t ≤ T }]− ,
where [a]+ = max{a, 0} and [a]− = min{a, 0}.
(ii) At the online phase, based on the fastest change rate given in Eq. (3.9), we can
perform the following reachability analysis to estimate the detection deadline. At current
time t, we calculate the reachable value for each sensor by

yd+ (i) = yt (i) × (1 + ∆+ (i) × δ × (d − t)), d > t,
yd− (i)

(3.10)

−

= yt (i) × (1 + ∆ (i) × δ × (d − t)), d > t.

The earliest time D(i) when the value of sensor i may touch the unsafe set is

D(i) = min{d|yd+ (i) ∈ U (i) ∨ yd− (i) ∈ U (i)},

(3.11)
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where U (i) is the unsafe set associated with sensor i. Finally, the detection deadline D is
calculated by
D = min{D(i)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}.

(3.12)

Note that our framework does not rely on any specific deadline estimation method, and
is always applicable as long as a detection deadline is outputted.

Drift Analyzer

With a detection deadline D as input, the Drift Analyzer determines the best drift
parameter that allows the attack to be detected before the deadline. For this component to
function properly, we need to first establish the relationship between the detection delay
and the drift parameter. This is achieved by performing offline profiling. Fig. 3.5 and Fig.
3.6 depict that there is a relationship among the drift parameter, detection delay and false
positives. Armed with this information and the CUSUM tuning tools provided in [69], we
are able to build a drift-parameter-detection delay pair that ensures we do not exceed the
acceptable false positive rate. In other words, We build a lookup table based on the offline
profiling results. To perform its online adaptation functionality, the Drift Analyzer simply
queries the lookup table to output the drift parameter that adjusts the detection delay to
meet the given detection deadline.
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3.1.5

Evaluation

Implementation and Experimental Setup

We implemented our deep learning model in Python, utilizing PyTorch Deep Learning
framework. We train the model on Ubuntu 18.04 64-bit with sixteen Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2680 v4 @ 2.40GHz CPUs, two Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 GPUs and 64 GB
RAM. We follow a 60/20/20 proportions for splitting the original dataset into
training/validation/test sets. The experimental model is made up of 100 hidden CNN
layers and 100 hidden RNN layers. The model was trained for 100 epochs. Metrics used
for the test accuracy were Root Relative Square Error (RSE) and Relative Absolute Error
(RAE). The accuracy for our experimental model was 0.0032 (RSE) and 0.0018 (RAE).

Dataset Description

We used the publicly-available real-world automotive CAN bus dataset from the
AEGIS Big Data Project [44] 1 for our experiment. The sensor data, sampled at 20Hz, was
collected during trips in the same passenger vehicle. More than 40 sensor measurements
were collected including but not limited to those listed in Table 3.1. Specifically, the data
contains about 2.5 hours of driving data (about 160,000 data points).
1

https://zenodo.org/record/3267184#.X5YtpIhKg2x
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Table 3.1: Some sensors in the dataset used in experiment.
CAN bus Sensors

GPS Sensors

IMU Sensors

ASR
AccPedal
AirIntakeTemperature
AmbientTemperature
BoostPressure
BrkVoltage
EngineSpeed CAN
EngineTemperature
Kickdown
MFS Tip Down
MFS Tip Up
SteerAngle
Trq FrictionLoss
Trq Indicated
VehicleSpeed
WheelSpeed FL
WheelSpeed FR
WheelSpeed RL
WheelSpeed RR
Yawrate

Acceleration
Current sec
Direction
Distance
Velocity

Accelerometer X
Accelerometer Y
Accelerometer Z
Body acceleration X
Body acceleration Y
Body acceleration Z
G force
Magnetometer X
Magnetometer Y
Magnetometer Z
Velocity X
Velocity Y
Velocity Z

ASR = Acceleration Slip Regulation, ACC = Acceleration,
BRK = Break, MFS = Misfiring System, TRQ = Torque,
FL = Front Left, FR = Front Right, RL = Rear Left,
RR = Rear Right, G = Gravity
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Attacks

The dataset does not include any anomalous events or scenarios, hence we manually
modify portions of the dataset to simulate physical attacks that achieve similar goals of a
real attacker. Based on the attacks discussed in section 3.1.1 and the attacks in [58], we
evaluate our work under (1) modification, (2) delay and (3) replay attacks.
We simulate four attack scenarios under modification attacks and one each for the
delay and replay attacks. Attack 1 adds a fixed value to the sensor readings for a period of
time. This simulates the attacker spoofing the sensor measurement as done in Fake Data
Injection (FDI) attacks. Attack 2 sets the sensor reading to a fixed value indicating a
spoofing attack that spoofs sensor readings to a specific value. Attack 3 incrementally
changes sensor measurement. Here the attacker has a target value to spoof the sensor, yet
he does not set the value right away. Rather, he gradually adds small values (e.g 0.01 kph)
to current sensor readings until the target spoofing value is reached. In real life, an attacker
might use this strategy with the intent of evading detection mechanisms. Attack 4 sends
both normal sensor values and malicious/fake sensor values alternately and repeatedly.
Like Attack 3, a real attack might use this tactic to mislead attack detection mechanisms.
Attack 5 mimics delay attack where the attacker causes a 10s delay in sensor data
transmission. Attack 6 is a replay attack where the sensor data from a previous time are
replayed.
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Fig. 3.7.: Front-Left wheel speed sensor measurement showing the predicted and observed
values.

Experiments and Results

We perform various experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our
proposed framework.
Experiment I: The first experiment tests if the behavior predictor component was able
to capture the behavior of the automotive CPS accurately. Fig. 3.7 shows the normal
behavior of the front-left wheel speed sensor. It can be seen in the figure that the behavior
predictor’s prediction closely matches the observed sensor measurement operating under
normal conditions. A similar plot for the engine speed, oil temperature and boost pressure
sensors shown in Fig. 3.8 further indicate the behavior predictor is able to capture the
system’s nominal behavior. The error shown in Fig.3.7 has a close to zero-average, an
indication that the predictor method is not biased. Further residual analysis shows the
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Fig. 3.8.: Observed and predicted values for the oil temperature, engine speed and boost
pressure sensors.

residuals follow a normal Gaussian distribution and do not have any trend, cyclic or
seasonal structure in the error plot.
Experiment II: We evaluate the attack detector component in this experiment. The
component is tasked to detect the attack scenarios described in 3.1.5. We randomly placed
10 simulated attacks in each case. Fig. 3.9 shows the proposed framework is effective in
detecting various attack scenarios. In the figure, the red dots indicate the points where the
CUSUM-based attack detector raises an alert for the attacks. It can also be observed that
the detector raises alarm only when the abrupt change is significant and has persisted for a
while thus reducing flagging transients faults as attacks. For instance, a close-up look at
one of the attack points (see Fig. 3.10), shows the detector observed an abrupt change in
speed at time 39.95s (indicated by the green arrow) but did not raise alarm immediately
until 42.1s.
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Fig. 3.9.: Results of the attack detector’s detection of various attack scenarios discussed in
section 3.1.5
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Fig. 3.10.: A close-up look at one case of attack 1 detection.
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Experiment III: In this experiment, we measure and analyze the false-positive (FP) and
false-negative (FN) rates under various drift and threshold monitoring parameters. FP is
measured by inputting normal data (no attack) into the framework and counting the
number of false alarms rate. We measure FN by inputting data containing simulated
attacks and counting the number of attacks that the framework missed raising an alert for.
Note here that miss means that an alert was not raised within the duration of the attack.
Therefore, alarms that occurred shortly after the attack ended were not counted. The
results in Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.12 show the FP and FN rates respectively for this
experiment. In the legend of the figures, A1, A2...A6 represent the various attack
scenarios discussed above, the numbers (3, 4, 5) represent the threshold monitoring
parameter. For example, A1-3 represents Attack 1 being monitored with a threshold of 3.
In FP analysis, we observe that the CUSUM drift parameter with value 0 produces very
high FP rates. However, the FP rate plummets with drift values greater than 0. The FN
rate results, on the other hand, show the drift parameter ranging from 0.2 to 0.8 produce
zero rates for all attack case scenarios. This implies that for most attacks, the behavior of
the detector framework can be adapted to meet attack deadlines whilst still maintaining
very low FN rates. However, beyond that range (0.2 - 0.8), we observe the FN increases.
Experiment IV: This experiment measures the detection delay ϕ i.e. the time it takes
to detect the attack after its launch. This metric allows us to evaluate the time needed for
our attack detection framework to disclose or alert an attack. If an attack starts at time ks ,
and the attack detection mechanism detects it at time kd , ϕ is defined as: ϕ = kd − ks . The
lower the value of ϕ, the better the attack detection mechanism and as such, reduces the
impact of the attack.
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Fig. 3.11.: False positive rate for the various attack scenarios under different monitoring
parameters (drift and threshold).

A1-5
A1-4
A1-3
A2-5
A2-4
A2-3
A3-5
A3-4
A3-3
A4-5
A4-4
A4-3
A5-5
A5-4
A5-3
A6-5
A6-4
A6-3

False Negative Rate

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Drift

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Fig. 3.12.: False negative rate for the various attack scenarios under different monitoring
parameters (drift and threshold).
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Table 3.2: Detection delay in seconds for the attack scenarios. A1 refers to Attack 1, A2
refers to Attack 2 and so on.
Drift

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

A6

0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8

0.3
0.35
0.4
0.53
0.7
0.98
1.40

1.31
1.58
1.78
1.98
2.58
2.82
3.13

1.57
1.75
1.94
2.09
2.26
2.41
2.56

0.30
0.35
0.42
0.52
0.67
0.94
1.54

2.21
2.31
2.37
2.48
2.55
2.66
2.76

0.42
0.60
1.64
2.24
2.72
3.55
4.63

Table 3.2 shows the results of the detection delay ϕ for the various simulated attacks
(see section 3.1.5). Note that the simulated attacks lasted for 10s. The result in the table
suggests the attacks were detected while the system was being attacked rather than after
the attack ended. While this is desirable, we show in a subsequent experiment that it is
more desirable and important for real-time systems to detect an attack before a detection
deadline. Further, the result shows the relationship between the CUSUM drift parameter
and the detection delay. The detection delay increases as the drift parameter increases.
Experiment V: This experiment analyses the effect of adaptive detection. For real-time
systems, it is not only desirable but required that the attack detection mechanisms are able
to detect attacks before the detection deadline D, 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ D. Fig. 3.13 shows how the
real-time adaptive detection enables Attack 3 to be detected under different deadlines. In
the figure, we observe that, in order to meet Deadline 1 (1sec), the drift parameter has to
be adjusted to a value not greater than 0.25. Though Attack 3 can be detected with a drift
parameter of say 0.8, it cannot satisfy Deadline 1 because its corresponding detection
delay is 1.8 seconds.
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Fig. 3.13.: Adaptive detection for Attack 3.

Experiment VI: This experiment compares a fixed time-window approach with our
real-time adaptive attack detection approach. The goal is to show how our framework
adapts it behavior based on the drift parameter in order to meet an attack deadline.
The time-window implementation used in this experiment is similar to [14]’s attack
detector monitoring algorithm. It sums up the square errors between the observed and the
prediction. When the time window expires, it determines if the accumulated mean square
exceeds a threshold. The accumulated sum is reset when the time window expires. Note
that the time-window approach can only raise an alarm after its time-window expiration.
We compare the two approaches based on the attacks described in Section 3.1.5 and
the case scenario depicted in Fig. 3.14. In this case scenario, an attack occurs at 40s with a
detection deadline estimated at 45s. The red dots in the figure represent the alarm raised
by our framework whereas the blue dot refers to the alarm raised by the time-window
attack detector approach. We observe that the time-window approach rightly determines
that an attack occurred in all cases, however, the alert is raised after the detection deadline.
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Fig. 3.14.: Comparing our framework with a fixed time-window approach. In all attack
scenarios (see 3.1.5), the attack occurs at 10s and has a deadline set at 45s.

In a real-world situation, this would mean the attack detection alert is raised after the
damage has occurred. Our framework, on the other, raises an alarm before the deadline.
Experiment VII: We compare our work with a recent anomaly detector that closely relates
to our work [37]. Like our work, the researchers exploit the natural redundancy that exists
among heterogeneous sensors and they also employ deep learning techniques (deep
autoencoder) to detect attacks. Whereas they focus only on the rightness of attack
detection, we focus on detecting attacks before a detection deadline by adapting the attack

Reconstruction error
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Fig. 3.15.: Attack detection in deep automated [37] attack detector.

detection mechanism. More importantly, in order to decide to raise an attack alert, their
approach monitors only one control period. Due to the adaptive nature of our approach to
meet a deadline, the number of control periods that it monitors varies. Their detection
mechanism raises an alert when the reconstruction error of the decoder is above a certain
threshold. We trained a model based on [37] and tuned the hyper-parameters with our
dataset for a fair comparison. The deep autoencoder attack detector is tasked to detect the
same attack scenarios we subjected our approach to in Experiment II. Fig. 3.15 shows the
results. The green marks are the data points that represent the attack. Comparing this
results with our results shown in Fig. 3.9, the detector in [37] produces high false alarms.

3.1.6

Discussion

Stealthy Attacks

While our proposed system effectively detects physical attacks against automotive
CPS we do not rule out completely the possibility of it being vulnerable to stealthy
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attacks. In this attack, the attacker spoofs sensor values that do not exceed the determined
threshold, hence the attack detection system raises no alarm. Gradually, the attacker is
able to deviate the CPS to his desired target. References [78] and [91] note that this
weakness is also found in physics-based attack detection (PBAD) systems. In the real
world, a stealthy attack is hard to launch as it requires very detailed knowledge about the
system dynamics and ensuring that all the laws of physics are obeyed [14]. On one hand,
our proposed detection framework provides some defense as the Behavior Predictor
component learns the system dynamics from multiple heterogeneous sensors. To evade
our framework, the attacker may have to launch spoofing attacks against all the
heterogeneous sensors simultaneously such that it maintains the natural correlation among
the sensors that the proposed framework also learned. Achieving such a sophisticated
attack in the real world is hard since each sensor attack requires specific tools and
equipment to successfully launch. On the other hand, we agree with [91] that a
combination of detection schemes can also be implemented to mitigate stealthy attacks.
We suggest combining a deep learning approach like our work with PBAD approaches
can be a viable solution against stealthy attacks.

State Estimation and Attack Response

This work has focused on physical sensor attack detection without attack response.
Once our framework detects an attack, the behavior predictor can also be used to predict
values that can be used for state estimation. The state estimation can be forwarded to the
controller for recovery control. In the next chapter, we discuss our proposed framework
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for attack response that recovers the CPS from an attack so that continual functioning is
attained.

3.2

Variable Window-based attack detection

We have shown in preceding chapters that the deep intertwinement of software and
hardware has increased the attack surface of systems that once had closed architectures.
The research community has responded with solutions that allow physical attacks to be
detected. The main idea behind these detectors is the use of various techniques such as
Kalman-filter, machine or deep learning techniques, vector autoregression (VAR) models,
Auto-Regressive Moving Average with eXogenous inputs (ARMAX), AutoRegressive
(AR) models, Linear Dynamical Statespace (LDS) models, etc, to predict the evolution of
the system state ŷk [91]. The forecast is compared with the observed sensor reading yk . If
the residual rk , i.e. the difference between the forecast and sensor measurement, exceed
what is expected, that may be an indication of an attack or fault. Many well-known
techniques have been used to examine or perform statistical tests on the residuals to
subsequently detect the attack or alarm. Such techniques include Cumulative Sum
(CUSUM) [34, 71], Sequential Probability Ratio Testing (SPRT) [93, 96], Generalized
Likelihood Ratio (GLR) testing [10], Compound Scalar Testing (CST) [27, 79] and
windowed techniques. Each of these techniques have their advantages and disadvantages
which are often dictated by the scenario. We focus on attack detectors that employ the
windowed approach to detect attacks in this work.
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The windowed procedure generally accumulates the sum of the residuals over a sliding
window. Many existing solutions have deployed this procedure for fault detection and
attack detection [14, 33]. Compared with one-shot approaches such as the static
chi-squared detectors where only one control period is considered, windowed approach
has the benefit of historical observations and therefore tend to have fewer false alarms.
However, we assert that these time-windowed detectors are inadequate for real-time
systems for two reasons. First, authors of windowed solutions strive to select the “best”
time window length that produces low false alarms and short detection delay. Detection
delay is the time it takes to detect an attack after its launch. As the results in [14] showed,
on one hand, a short time window leads to high false positive alarms and short detection
delay. On the other hand, a longer time window leads to low false positives and longer
detection delay. Clearly, there is a trade-off between the false alarm rate and the detection
delay. Therefore selecting a window length that attains shortest detection delay and low
false alarm can be difficult task if not unachievable.
Secondly, selecting a fixed window length for the attack detector gives it a static
behavior which is contradictory to the behavior of dynamic CPS which evolve into various
states as it interacts with its environment. Choosing a fixed time-window length means
that an alert can only be raised when the time-window expires, causing the detector to
have a fixed detection delay. With a fixed detection delay, these detectors are unable to
meet detection deadline i.e. the time by which attack must be detected before the system
enters unsafe operating state. It is desirable and requisite that the CPS does not enter
unsafe operating states when an attack occurs, unfortunately, fixed-window detectors are
unable to ensure this in dynamic systems. It can be said that existing works have focused
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only on raising attack alerts whilst overlooking detection deadlines. Obviously, raising an
attack alert after damaging consequences have occurred is as bad as the non-existence of
an attack detector.
In this dissertation, (1) we show that a variable-time window detector is more usable in
real-time systems and (2) we propose a variable-time windowed framework for detecting
sensor attacks before the system enters unsafe state. The framework consist of three major
components: attack detector, state predictor and deadline analyzer. At the core of our
framework is the attack detector that uses a stateful detection strategy that performs
statistical tests on residuals using variable window size depending on the detection
deadline to be met. The state predictor utilizes a data model that captures the nominal
behavior of the automotive CPS to predict sensor measurement. The deadline analyzer
component proposes a method that calculates the detection deadline after which the
system might enter unsafe operating state.
The contributions of this work is as follows: (1) we argue and show that a
variable-time window detector is more usable for real-time systems. (2) we propose,
design and implement the variable-time attack detector prototype. (3) we perform
evaluations of the proposed framework using data from a real testbed, real vehicle and
Ardupilot’s SITL Rover simulator
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3.2.1

Preliminaries

Detection Strategy

As noted above, attack detectors perform statistical tests on the residuals rk . They raise
alerts whenever the expected and observed significantly differ i.e. the residual is large.
Two main strategies are used for attack detection namely stateless and stateful tests [91].
In a stateless test, only one time shot is considered and the detector raises an alert for
every deviation at time k (i.e. |yk − ŷk | = rk ≥ τ , where τ is a predetermined threshold).
This strategy tend to produce many false alarms as the cause of the deviation may be a
transient fault at that point in time. Typical example is found in chi-squared (χ̃2 ) detectors.
Stateful strategy, on the other hand, considers multiple time-steps to determine if an
alert should be raised. It maintains a statistic Sk that keeps track of the historical changes
of rk . An alert is raised whenever a persistent deviation is observed over multiple
time-steps (i.e. Sk ≥ τ ). Keeping track of the historical changes of rk can be done in
multiple ways such as (1) using change detectors (2) taking an exponential weighted
moving average (EWMA) and (3) taking an average over a time-window. We focus on
detectors that use the stateful strategy and uses a fixed-time window.

Threat Model

The threat model assumes that the adversary is able to compromise the sensor by
leveraging any physical attack techniques that injects interfering signals (magnetic field,
light, etc) in the physical environment of the sensor. Such an attack compromises the
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integrity of sensor measurements, hence, a false system state is transmitted to the
controller. The false sensor data have a misleading ripple effect on the control input that
the controller computes and the control output performed by the actuator. In the end, the
physical attack drifts the system away from its reference state.
We assume that the attacker, however, does not have access to the control program
running on-board and the proposed framework components. As noted above, we do not
focus on cyber attacks i.e. attacks that are launched via software or firmware, as they can
be effectively defended by existing software security techniques (e.g., CFI). Rather, we
focus only on sensor attacks. Attacks that target non-vehicle control logic such as the
automotive CPS’ computer vision system are out of scope.

Framework Overview

The components of the proposed framework function together to raise an alert for a
sensor attack before the CPS enters into unsafe operating state. The state predictor
component predicts the expected sensor measurements as the system operates. The
window adaptor component computes the detection deadline and the window length
(detection delay) that enables the framework to meet detection deadlines. The attack
detector component takes input from the window adaptor and the state predictor to
perform the following tasks respectively: (1) computes the residual rk which is the
difference between the expected values and the observed. If rk is large, it obtains the
window size as input from the deadline analyzer.
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Fig. 3.16.: System design of variable window real-time sensor attack detection framework.

(2) the window size input is used in the detection strategy. Note that choosing variable
window size allows our detector framework to adapt its behavior to meet detection
deadlines.

3.2.2

Design of Attack Detector

We present the design of the attack detector component in this section. The component
is responsible for performing the attack detection strategy of our framework utilizing
inputs from the Window Adaptor (§3.2.4) and the State Predictor (§3.2.3) components.
We formulate the attack detection problem as follows. Given the predicted (expected)
sensor value ŷt ∈ Rn , the sensor reading yt ∈ Rn , a predetermined threshold τ , and the
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window length l, we want to determine the appropriate time to raise an alarm talarm before
the system touch unsafe state:

talarm =

k
X

rt > τ

(3.13)

t=k−l+1

where rt = |yt − yˆt |. Note here that the moving sum of the residuals is taken over a
window [k − l + 1, k]. yˆt is the output of the state predictor which has the responsibility of
predicting expected sensor values. The window adaptor provides the window length l to
be used in the detection strategy.

3.2.3

Design of State Predictor

We present the design of the state predictor component in this subsection. This
component is responsible for predicting or estimating the system states based on historical
data from a fixed-size sliding window, i.e. fixed-size reception fields.
Temporal Convolutional Network(TCN) is an architecture that is designed to capture
the action segmentation in time-series at first [56, 57]. Recently, some work showed TCN
outperformed RNN-based structure on various time-series tasks [38, 59, 64, 99].
Additionally, TCN can be easily trained in parallel since there is no gate components in
the network. Aside from that, there are 3 motivations of using TCN instead of RNN-based
structure such as LSTM and GRU for our state predictor.
• First, the prediction accuracy is higher than LSTM. In other words, TCN can
generate better prediction that are more close to the the system state.
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Fig. 3.17.: Temporal Convolutional Networks structure

• Secondly, some work showed that the inference time of TCN is less than
LSTM [55]. This attribute can improve the framework’s decision making speed as
the expected sensor speed is inferred more quickly.
• Lastly, since the TCN could be fairly deep, TCN is capable of memorizing longer
history than LSTM. A longer memory helps to generate better prediction when there
are long-term dependency between data among the time horizon.
The structure of TCN as shown in Fig. 3.17, the prediction on each step get benefits from
various length time dependency cross each layer. Therefore, TCN has fairly long memory
with the increment of the depth. TCN does not have complex components in the network
as compared with LSTM which has gates, the inference speed of TCN should be faster
than LSTM at the same level of accuracy.
As shown in Fig. 3.17, each layer has a different dilation rate s, i.e. distance between
convolution steps, which helps the networks decide the steps that the convolution will be
applied to. Furthermore, a residual connection is responsible for combining the
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(l)

convolution signal and inputs of the layer. Then, the dilated Ŝt of lth layer at step t and
(l)

results after implementing residual connections St could be formalized as [56]:



(l)
(l−1)
(l−1)
Ŝt = f W (1) St−s + W (2) St
+b
(l)

(l−1)

St = St

(l)

+ V Ŝt + e

(3.14)
(3.15)

where W ( i) denotes the ith convolution filter in the layer, b denotes the bias vector, v and
e denotes the weights and bias vector of the residual.

3.2.4

Design of Window Adaptor

This component functions to determine the time window length to be used in the
attack detector. It is made up two sub-systems: the deadline estimator and window-length
analyzer. Each of the components is discussed below.

Deadline Estimator

The deadline estimation method used here is the same as the one used in the
CUSUM-based framework discussed above and therefore, it shall not be repeated here.
The interested reader is referred to §3.1.4 above for the details of the deadline estimation
method. In the end, this component outputs the detection deadline by which an alert must
be raised before the system enters unsafe state. Again, note that our framework does not
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rely on any specific deadline estimation method, and is always applicable as long as a
detection deadline is outputted.

Window-length Analyzer

This component determines the appropriate window length to be used in the detection
strategy. Remember that the choice of time-window length dictates a trade-off between
false alarm rate and detection delay. This component enables the framework to bias
detection delay and false alarm rate. One of the goals of the proposed attack detector
framework is to meet the attack detection deadline.
This component functions in two phases. The offline phase profiles the CPS to build a
lookup table that establishes the relationship between the time-window length, and the
detection delay. This phase is performed only once for the CPS. During the online phase,
to perform its online adaptive functionality, the window analyzer queries the lookup table
to output the time window length that adjusts the detection delay to meet the given
detection deadline.

3.2.5

Evaluation

This section evaluates the proposed solution’s effectiveness. First, we assess the state
predictor’s ability to learn the nominal system behavior. Second, we compare the fixed
window approach with our variable approach. Lastly, we measure the false-positive and
false negative rates.
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We implemented our deep learning model in Python, utilizing PyTorch Deep Learning
framework. We train the model on Ubuntu 18.04 64-bit with sixteen Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2680 v4 @ 2.40GHz CPUs, two Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 GPUs and 64 GB
RAM. We follow a 60/20/20 proportions for splitting the original dataset into
training/validation/test sets. We used the publicly-available real-world automotive CAN
bus dataset from the AEGIS Big Data Project [44] 2 for our experiment. The sensor data,
sampled at 20Hz, was collected during trips in the same passenger vehicle.

3.2.6

Experiments and results

Experiment I: This experiment measures the state estimation capability of the state
predictor. Its ability to make predictions means the model captured the nominal behavior
https://zenodo.org/record/3267184#.X5YtpIhKg2x
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Fig. 3.18.: The state predictor forecasting the wheel speed sensor.
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well. Fig. 3.18 shows the results of the state predictors prediction of the wheel speed
measurement. It can be observed from the figure that the two lines representing the actual
measurements and the forecast are matching closely. It is therefore an indication that the
nominal system behavior were captured. As an approximation of the system behavior, the
model incurred near-zero errors on the average. This can be improved upon by using more
training data that contains more nominal system data.
Experiment II: In this experiment, we measure the false-positive (FP) and
false-negative (FN) rates of the detector. First, we embed ten simulated attack ranges in
the test data set. The first attack range compromises the observed sensor measurement by
adding 0.2 km/h. The magnitude of subsequent attack ranges increases by 0.2 km/h i.e.
the second attack range adds 0.4 km/h to the data, the third 0.6 km/h and so on.
Second, the detector is tasked to detect the ten attacks under different monitoring
parameters (window length and threshold). Fig. 3.19 shows the results of FP. It can be
observed that as the window length gets larger, the FP decreases. This observation is due
to normalization of the accumulated errors before the threshold comparison. Hence, a
larger window results in smaller normalized errors. On the other hand, the FN is observed
in Fig. 3.20 to increase as the window get larger. The same reason for the FP results also
attributes to the FN observation. These two observations show the detector can vary its
behavior by varying the window length and still achieve acceptable low FP and FN.
Experiment III: In this experiment, we show the proposed framework enables the
detector to achieve varying detection delays in order to meet detection deadlines. We
experiment under a scenario shown in Fig. 3.21. An attack occurs at 10s which has to be
detected by 16s (detection deadline). In the figure, we observe that the various window
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Fig. 3.19.: The false-positive rate measurements under various monitoring parameters.
FPR-1 means a threshold of 1. FPR-2 means a threshold of 2 and so on.
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Fig. 3.20.: The false-negative rate measurements under various monitoring parameters.
FNR-1 means a threshold of 1. FNR-2 means a threshold of 2 and so on.
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Fig. 3.21.: Comparing our framework with a fixed time-window approach. In all scenarios
the fixed-time-window detector raises the alarm at 17.5s always. Our approach enables
varying the window length such that alarms can be raised before the detection deadline.
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length achieve varying detection delays. For instance, Fig 3.21a results in a detection
delay of 11s whereas Fig 3.21e results in a detection delay of 15s. Note that a
fixed-time-window detector always have the same detection delay (17.5s in our
experiment) which prevents it from meeting many detection deadline.

3.2.7

Conclusion

In this work, we have shown that sensor detectors should be able to bias its metrics
when the system sits in various states. Specifically, we argue that window-based detectors
can vary the window length to achieve faster detection delay to meet a detection deadline
or to achieve a certain rate of false alarm. Further, we proposed and evaluated an adaptive
detection framework that uses three components to achieve these.
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4. RECOVERY-BY-LEARNING
Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) are susceptible to non-invasive physical
attacks such as sensor spoofing attacks that are beyond the classical cybersecurity domain.
These attacks have motivated numerous research efforts on attack detection, but little
attention on what to do after detecting an attack. The importance of attack recovery is
emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack’s impact on a system and restore it to
continue functioning. There are only a few works addressing attack recovery, but they all
rely on prior knowledge of system dynamics. To overcome this limitation, this dissertation
proposes Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores
CPS from sensor attacks. The framework leverages natural redundancy among
heterogeneous sensors and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework
consists of two major components: state predictor and data checkpointer. First, the
predictor is triggered to estimate systems states after the detection of an attack. We
propose a deep learning-based prediction model that exploits the temporal correlation
among heterogeneous sensors. Second, the checkpointer executes when no attack is
detected. We propose a double sliding window based checkpointing protocol to remove
compromised data and keep trustful data as input to the state predictor. Third, we
implement and evaluate the effectiveness of our framework using a realistic data set and a
ground vehicle simulator. The results show that our method restores a system to continue
functioning in presence of sensor attacks.
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4.1

Preliminaries

4.1.1

Scope and Contributions.

This paper focuses on sensor attack-recovery. We assume an attack detector is already
in place, and our goal is to take the alerts generated by the detector to recover the system
from the attacks. The contributions of this work are as follows. (i) We propose
Recovery-by-Learning, a model-free attack recovery framework. (ii) We propose a deep
learning based state prediction method and a double sliding window based checkpointing
protocol. (iii) We perform extensive data-driven simulations to validate the proposed
methods.

4.1.2

Sensor Correlation

Autonomous CPSs are equipped with a number of sensors that enable them to perform
their function. The sensors monitor various physical properties such as engine revolutions,
vehicle and wheel speed, oil temperature, boost pressure, accelerator pedals, location, etc.
It is observed that a subset of sensors on the CPS responds to a physical phenomenon in a
correlated or related manner. Such a group of sensors are referred to as heterogeneous
sensors or are said to exhibit inherent sensor redundancy. For instance, applying the
brakes of a vehicle causes decrements in the engine’s RPM, wheel speed, vehicle speed
and GPS speed sensors measurements. Similarly, pressing the accelerator pedal leads to
increases in the readings of these heterogeneous sensors. Fig. 3.3 shows the pairwise
correlation among sensors in an automobile using the dataset of [44]. Details of the data
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set will be given in Section 4.3.2. It is observed in the figure that the wheel speed sensors
have a strong correlation with the engine RPM and boost pressure sensors. Hence, when
the wheel speed sensor reading increases as a result of applying the accelerator pedals, the
readings of the engine RPM and boost pressure will also be observed to increase under
normal conditions [25, 31, 58, 90, 94].
We believe that exploiting and capturing this inherent sensor redundancy allows us to
approximate the nominal system behavior which in turn, enables the accurate prediction
of system behavior such as sensor readings. We leverage this notion in our proposed
attack recovery system.

4.1.3

Threat Model

We consider the attack scenario where an attacker launches physical attacks against
the CPS sensors. Examples of such attacks include optical sensor spoofing [17],
gyroscope sensor spoofing [87], accelerometer spoofing attacks [88] among others. These
attacks transmit compromised sensor data which does not reflect the actual system state.
When the controller receives and processes such data, erroneous control inputs are
calculated and issued resulting in safety problems, abnormal system operation and
possibly stalling the CPS.
As noted above, there are many proposed attack detection solutions, therefore, we
assume the existence of a sensor attack detector that is able to raise an alert whenever any
of these attacks occur. Our goal is to automatically respond to the attack alert and steer the
system towards a reference state thereby ensuring safety and CPS operation continuity.
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We also assume the controller, actuator, the proposed deep learning model and the stored
historical sensor data are not compromised.

4.1.4

System Overview

Fig. 4.1 shows an overview of the proposed system. It consists of an offline phase and
an online phase. The offline phase involves the data collection, pre-processing of the data,
and training the model on the data. The online phase has two major components: the State
Predictor and Checkpointer. The state predictor estimates system states when the observed
sensor data are no longer trustworthy. The state predictor is built on a deep learning model
that captures the nominal system behavior. The Checkpointer ensures valid historical state
estimates are stored so that the state predictor can output accurate state estimations.
The proposed system works as follows: When a time-window-based attack detector
raises an alert, the state predictor is activated. The checkpointer provides valid and trustful
sensor values as input to the state predictor to predict state estimates. The predicted values
are forwarded to the controller to perform recovery control commands. In the event the
attack detector does not raise an alert, the system continues to function and only the
checkpointer performs tasks to warrant that only valid historical sensor data is stored as
checkpoints.

4.2

Recovery System Design

We describe the details of the proposed attack recovery system in this section.
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Rationale. Estimating the accurate behavior of a cyber-physical system, specifically
sensor measurement is non-trivial, yet it is a crucial step in attack recovery. The actual
behavior of the CPS is guarded by physical laws hence under normal conditions, the
physical system properties, called physical invariant should always hold. While physical
invariant can be captured using a physical system model, it requires in-depth knowledge
of the system dynamics which may not be easy to attain.
We propose an attack recovery system that does not require substantial knowledge of
system dynamics. We treat the physical system as a black box yet we are able to
approximate the nominal system behavior. We achieve this through a deep learning
technique that explores the natural redundancy among its heterogeneous sensors. Our
approach is based on the insight that under normal conditions, where physical laws are
obeyed, the sensor readings also indirectly obey physical laws. Therefore, by learning the
relationships among sensor data, the physical invariants are approximated. Having
modeled the system from sensor data, we are able to estimate sensor readings with a
near-zero error.

4.2.1

Problem formulation

We envision a solution for the attack recovery problem to involve two main steps. The
first step seeks to replace the corrupted sensor data that no longer reflect the true state of
the system with reconstructed system state estimates. The second step attempts to control
the CPS with the reconstructed values which we call recovery control. Given that we
consider multiple heterogeneous sensor time-series data or measurements in making a
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Fig. 4.1.: Design overview of our Recovery-by-Learning framework.

prediction, we formulate the first step as a deep learning multivariate time series
forecasting problem [54].
Hence, given valid historical time series output of n heterogeneous sensors
Y = {y1 , y2 , y3 , ...yK } where yk ∈ Rn , we aim to predict yk+h where h is a time ahead of
the current time k. We ensure Y = {y1 , y2 , y3 , ...yK } is always available by proposing a
checkpointing protocol to store such valid historical sensor data. For ease of presentation,
we assume that the system has full observability. Thus, we formulate the input matrix as
XK = {y1 , y2 , y3 , ..., yK } ∈ Rn×K . Once a valid prediction is made, the second step
undertakes a recovery control that uses the predicted values to drive the system.

4.2.2

System Components

Data Processor: Data pre-processing is an important step in a machine or deep
learning task. Specifically, we ensure we extract only features that have a strong
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correlation with the sensor of interest. While this can be achieved from domain
knowledge, we leverage Pearson Correlation Coefficients (PCC) statistic to observe this
correlation in the dataset. This step also has the potential to reveal correlations that may
not be obvious to humans. PCC outputs values between −1.0 and +1.0. Feature pairs that
have a strong positive correlation have PCC values close to +1.0. Conversely, a strong
negative correlation has PCC values close to −1.0. A zero PCC value indicates there is no
correlation between the features. For example, in Fig. 3.3, the vehicle speed sensor has
PCC of approximately 1.0 with the engine RPM and the wheel speed sensors. The vehicle
speed sensor, however, has a PCC value close to zero with the ambient temperature sensor.
LSTNet Training: In order to automatically exploit the correlation that exists in the
sensor data, we train a deep learning model based on LSTNet [54]. LSTNet was originally
developed to model long and short term temporal forecasting for multivariate time series.
The deep learning architecture captures nonlinear aspects of the system by using a
convolutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN) for exploiting
short and long term correlations respectively. To improve scalability and robustness, the
model also includes autoregressive units that enable the DL model to capture linear
aspects of the system as well. Fig. 4.2 shows the deep learning architecture that trains our
model. Training the model requires a number of hyperparameters to be specified, notable
among them is the window p. The window p specifies how many historical data points
should be used in making a prediction.
State Predictor: This component is built on the trained deep learning model training
discussed above. At this point, the data model has captured the nominal behavior of the
system by exploring the correlation among heterogeneous sensors. It serves as a nominal
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Fig. 4.3.: A double sliding window based checkpointing protocol.

approximation of the system behavior and hence it is able to make predictions of the
system behavior given the right input. In order to make the deep learning model useful in
a non-Python environment, we utilize Torchscript to build an intermediate representation
(IR) so that it can be used in high-performance environments such as C++ to make
predictions. The firmware of the ground vehicle simulator used in our experiment is
written in C++.
Checkpointer: Attack detection mechanisms take some time to detect an attack after
the attack’s launch, called detection delay, before raising an alert. As a result, we cannot
trust the sensor readings during the detection delay since they may have been
compromised. A successful recovery cannot be achieved if we rely on corrupted data,
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hence to address this issue, checkpointing protocols [50, 51, 62, 72] have been proposed to
provide trustworthy historical data that can be used for recovery. Though viable,
especially for model-based recovery methods [102], these protocols have limitations of
storing only one data point making it unsuitable for learning-based methods such as ours
which require an interval of data points for reconstructing sensor data.
The checkpointer component addresses this limitation by proposing a checkpointing
protocol shown in Fig. 4.3 that is not only applicable to learning-based methods but
model-based methods as well. The proposed protocol adopts a double sliding window
instead of the single sliding window approach used in existing works. This approach
enables the protocol to capture an interval of historical data and the detection delay. The
two windows of the protocol slide forward and records the sensor values x(t) as time ticks.
The protocol has three steps namely buffer, store, and delete. (1) Buffer: The data in
this step is possibly compromised and has a duration equivalent to the detector’s detection
delay. State estimates or sensor data within the detection window, x(t0 ), ..., x(th ) are first
buffered. (2) Store: Given that the detection window equals the detection delay, the data
points in this step have moved outside the detection window and are therefore considered
trustworthy. Note that an interval of time series datapoints (logging window data) are
stored instead of a single data point. Hence, for the interval [tk , t0 − 1], datapoints
{x(tk ), ..., x(t0 − 1)} are stored. Remember that this length is equal to the p window
hyperparameter of the LSTNet component discussed above. (3) Delete: All historical data
that are older than those in the logging window are no longer needed and should therefore
be deleted. Data points x(tk − 1) and x(tk − 2) are discarded as shown in the figure.
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When the detector raises an alarm, time series datapoints of the interval [tk , t0 ] will be
used to rebuild estimate x(th ).

4.3

Evaluation

We perform experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed attack recovery.

4.3.1

Implementation and Experimental Setup

We implemented our deep learning model in Python, utilizing PyTorch Deep Learning
framework. The experimental model is made up of 120 convolutional layers, 120 GRU
layers and an AR model. A batch size of 128 serves as input to the network. We train our
proposed DL model on Ubuntu 18.04 64-bit with sixteen Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680
v4 @ 2.40GHz CPUs, two Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 GPUs and 64 GB RAM. We split
the original dataset into 60% training, 20% validation and 20% test sets.

4.3.2

Dataset Description

We evaluate the efficiency of the proposed recovery system using the
publicly-available automotive CAN bus dataset from the AEGIS Big Data Project [44]
and data collected from Ardupilot SITL virtual ground vehicle.
The AEGIS data was collected during trips conducted by three drivers driving the
same vehicle. It contains more than 40 sensor measurements including but not limited to
the four wheel speed sensors, engine speed, vehicle speed, steering angle, ambient
temperature, GPS, oil temperature and boost pressure.
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Ardupilot SITL (software in the loop) is a simulator package that provides a native
executable that allows one to run Plane, Copter or Rover (ground vehicle) without any
hardware. The virtual ground vehicle that we use in our experiment runs a firmware
(APMrover2 2.5) that is used in real unmanned ground vehicle boards. The vehicle is
equipped with a number of sensors including GPS, IMU, RPM, optical flow sensors.

4.3.3

Experiments and Results

Experiment I: This experiment verifies if the State Predictor learned the nominal
behavior of the CPS and evaluates its effectiveness in reconstructing sensor data. We build
two models: the first one is based on the AEGIS dataset and the second is based on the
virtual unmanned ground vehicle’s sensor data. The second model is also used in a case
study to demonstrate how the proposed framework recovers the unmanned ground vehicle
(UGV) from a speed sensor attack.
Note, however, that in this experiment no attack has been launched. Fig. 4.4 and
Fig. 4.5 show the model predictions for the engine speed and boost pressure sensors in the
AEGIS test dataset. In the figures, the predicted speed (red line) closely matches the
observed speed (blue line) indicating the model captured the nominal behavior of the
vehicle. The figures also show the mean error or residual is near zero indicating the
predictor is not biased. Residual analysis shows the error follows a normal Gaussian
distribution and it is free from any cyclic, trend and seasonal structures.
We perform a similar experiment on the UGV. Using Mission Planner [8], we generate
missions (trajectory) that the vehicle executes. We collected the sensor data from the
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dataflash log and used it to build a data model. The model’s predictions for the UGV’s
speed sensor test dataset is shown in Fig. 4.6. The results depict a close match between
the model predictions and the observed sensor values. Similar to the results in Fig. 4.4 and
Fig. 4.5, there is a mean error in the model that is near-zero.
Experiment II - Case Study: We demonstrate attack recovery in this case study. The
attacker launches attack on the speed sensor which leads the cruise/speed controller to
issue wrong control inputs resulting in the UGV to travel above its cruise speed of 5 m/s.
Fig. 4.7 shows the case study considered in this experiment. At 60 sec, we simulate an
attack that transmits ρ − 4 m/s as the forward speed of the vehicle, where ρ is the actual
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speed of the vehicle. Hence, in order to maintain the reference speed, the PID controller
issued a higher throttle output that resulted in the vehicle to cruise at about 9 m/s. In
real-life, this scenario can be a safety concern.
Recovery control: When this attack is detected, we can no longer trust the sensor data
and therefore the system states must be estimated or reconstructed. Our proposed
framework responds with the goal of getting the UGV to cruise at its reference speed (5
m/s). It achieves that by activating the state predictor component which uses the data in the
checkpointer as input. The state predictor reconstructs sensor values that are forwarded to
the cruise controller. The controller calculates throttle outputs based on the reconstructed
values that eventually cause the vehicle to travel at the reference speed as seen in Fig. 4.8.
Experiment III: The effectiveness of the proposed framework largely depends on the p
value selected i.e. how many historical values are used for the deep learning model’s
prediction (see Section 4.2.2). Remember also that the p value is equal to the length of the
logging window in the proposed checkpointing protocol. In this experiment, we provide
an analysis of the p value so that the optimal value can be selected to predict more
accurate sensor values. We compare various p values based on accuracy metrics: mean
square error (mse), root relative squared error (rse) and relative absolute error (rae). Table
4.1 shows the results of the vehicle speed sensor values in the AEGIS dataset. Values
between 56 and 84 produced the highest prediction values. A similar analysis done on the
ground vehicle showed a slightly different results which leads us to conclude that the best
p value is device/dataset-specific.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of p values based one accuracy metrics.

4.4

p

mse

rse

rae

28
42
56

0.020843
0.019189
0.012859

0.0034
0.0034
0.0031

0.0020
0.0020
0.0018

84
168
188

0.011068
0.021194
0.008365

0.0032
0.0034
0.0034

0.0018
0.0020
0.0018

Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a model-free attack recovery system that does not
require in-depth knowledge of system dynamics and also allow autonomous CPS to use
existing components (controllers and sensors) without further duplication. We achieve this
by applying a novel deep learning framework to capture the nominal behavior of the
cyber-physical system. We proposed a new generalized double sliding window
checkpointing protocol that is usable both in model-based and learning-based recovery
methods. We performed experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
framework using real-world dataset and realistic unmanned ground vehicle simulator. Our
results show that our method restores a system to continue functioning in the presence of
sensor attacks.
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5. SUMMARY
Autonomous cyber-physical systems have transitioned from once-closed architectures to
open architectures due to the integration with information technology (IT). Increasingly,
these systems are getting more connected to the outside. The integration has enabled the
development of many convenient features but at the same time, it has exposed the system
to many new threats. The research community has proposed sensor attack detection
solutions as a reactive attack resilience measure. However, these solutions have not
adequately addressed timing constraints and usability.
This dissertation states the thesis that attack detection should bias different metrics
when a system sits in different states. For example, if the system is close to unsafe states,
reducing the detection delay is preferable to lowering the false alarm rate, and vice versa.
To that end, this dissertation presents the design and evaluation of two new frameworks
for the real-time detection of sensor attacks. Chapter 3 presents the two frameworks.
The first framework is a cumulative sum (CUSUM) based detection framework that
enables real-time adaptive detection using three necessary components: attack detector,
behavior predictor, and drift adaptor.
(i) Attack Detector. As the core of our framework, this component detects anomalies using
a CUSUM algorithm that monitors the cumulative sum of residuals between the nominal
(estimated by the behavior predictor) and observed sensor values. The algorithm raises an
alarm when the cumulative sum of the residuals is greater than a predefined threshold.
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Importantly, we augment this algorithm with a drift parameter that governs both the
detection delay and false alarms. That is, the algorithm can adjust the two metrics by
changing the drift parameter.
(ii) Behavior Predictor. This component estimates nominal sensor values that are fed to
the core component. It uses a deep learning (DL) model that is offline extracted through
uncovering and exploiting both the local and complex long-term dependencies in
multivariate sequential sensor measurements. Thus this model depends on little
knowledge of the physical system (e.g., dynamics). Further, this model leverages
convolutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network (RNN) to capture
non-linear aspects in sensor data and uses autoregressive models to capture linear aspects.
This combination results in high robustness and scalability in handling the sequential
sensor data.
(iii) Drift Adaptor. The third component is a drift adaptor that estimates a detection
deadline and then determines the drift parameter. The detector component uses this
parameter for adjusting the detection delay to ensure timely detection as the detection
deadline varies over time.
We implement our framework and validate it using realistic sensor data of automotive
CPS from the AEGIS Big Data Project [44]. The results demonstrate that our framework
can detect attacks in a real-time manner.
The second framework, also presented in Chapter 3, is a real-time adaptive attack
detector that biases detection delay and false alarm metrics by varying the window length
of the attack strategy. The three components of the proposed framework function together
to raise an alert for a sensor attack before the CPS enters into unsafe operating state.
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(i) State Predictor. Utilizing the higher prediction accuracy and inference time of
Temporal Convolutional Network (TCN), this component models the nominal system
behavior from offline system data. The trained model predicts the expected sensor
measurements in its online phase.
(ii) Window Adaptor. It computes the detection deadline and output the window length
(detection delay) that enables the framework to meet the detection deadlines.
(iii) Attack detector. This component determines the time at which an alert must be raised.
It combines the output of the window adaptor and the state predictor in the detection
algorithm. The algorithm computes the residual sequence rk over a window length. rk is
the difference between the expected sensor reading and the observed sensor measurement.
If rk is larger than the predetermined threshold, an alert is raised. Note that choosing
variable window size allows our detector framework to adapt its behavior to meet
detection deadlines.
The results obtained in the real-time adaptive sensor attack detection frameworks
shows we can dynamically alter the behavior of a detector by altering the CUSUM drift
parameter and time window length within a certain range. Values outside this range can
produce unacceptable system and detector functionalities.
Further, this dissertation notes that raising an alert alone after an attack occurs is not a
holistic solution for attack resiliency, this dissertation proposes Recovery-by-Learning, a
data-driven attack recovery framework that restores automotive cyber-physical systems
from sensor attacks. The framework, presented in Chapter 4, requires little knowledge of
the system’s dynamics, but leverages natural redundancy among heterogeneous sensors
and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework consists of two major
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components: state predictor and data checkpointer. The state predictor is activated to
estimate system states when an attack is detected. The predicted states are forwarded to
the controller to calculate and issue appropriate control commands to bring the system
back to normalcy. The data checkpointer executes in the normal mode when no attack is
detected. It employs a checkpointing protocol to remove corrupted data and keep valid
historical data as input to the state predictor to make state estimation. The protocol uses
double sliding windows: detection window and logging window. The former
accommodates the substantial detection delay (i.e., the time interval between the start of
an attack and the detection of it), during which the correctness of the sensor data is still in
question and thus using them may result in unsuccessful recovery. The logging window
governs sufficient trustful data for the state prediction.
The recovery framework is implemented and evaluated on AEGIS dataset and
Ardupilot SITL rover. The results of the experiment and case study shows the framework
enables the CPS to return to its reference point after an attack has been detected.
In conclusion, this dissertation has argued that attack detection should have a
preference on different metrics when a system sits in different states. We have proposed
solutions that enable CPS to achieve that and a solution to provide a recovery measure that
mitigates the effects of an attack. The proposed solutions in this dissertation provide a
holistic real-time attack resilient solution. Also, our real-time adaptive attack detection
sets a new research direction that creates the awareness for the need of dynamic detectors,
and motivates the proposal of new solutions to achieve that.
Future Work: This dissertation has carried out simulation-based evaluation of the
proposed frameworks as our lab’s testbed is still under construction. While the results
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show a viable solution, future work is required to provide hardware evaluations and make
necessary improvements to the framework. Further, to ensure the smooth interaction of
system components, future work is required to handle the scheduling of the component.
Lastly, code and model optimization tasks are required to ensure the frameworks are
executable on resource constrained systems.
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